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1. Introduction 
My PhD Dissertation consists of 3 independent essays. One thing all three essays have 
in common is that they focus on financial decision-making. During my practical experi-
ence at the City of Zurich Pension Fund I frequently observed various different sorts of 
financial decision-making processes and those observations caught my attention. First, 
because several factors might bias the perception, the importance and the rationality of a 
financial decision and second because the characteristics of the decision-maker(s) might 
matter. This first chapter mainly serves as an introduction into the topics of my Disser-
tation and outlines the reasons why I have chosen this topic in general. 
The first essay deals with individual estimations of returns on financial markets in a 
sample of Swiss pension plan managers. The second one asks Swiss pension plan man-
agers about the abilities of their own pension plan to achieve above average returns on 
financial markets. The main goal of those two essays is to analyze the degree of over-
confidence among the participants based on a self-developed questionnaire. The third 
essay addresses differences between groups and individuals in financial decision-
making on an experimental market. Each essay will in detail address their academic as 
well as their practical implications.  
I realized that many people, especially in the asset management industry, are very con-
fident about their knowledge and their abilities to beat market index returns. Most active 
asset managers usually claim to outperform the market in the future. Most of the pen-
sion funds in Switzerland manage their assets actively and try to outperform market 
indices. However, beating a broadly diversified market-capitalized stock index is very 
difficult as Sharpe (1991) has demonstrated. Most of the academic studies report that 
only a minor percentage of investors realize an outperformance in the long run after 
costs (Carhart (1997) or Malkiel (2004)). So the basic goals of my first two essays were 
to test and to describe the observed confidence levels in a scientific way and to relate 
those findings to the way pension plans manage their assets today. 
One area of today’s behavioral finance literature deals with the phenomenon of over-
confidence which offers a perfect starting point to address those basic goals. Overconfi-
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dence is a complex phenomenon with various facets including miscalibration and the 
better-than-average-effect (Glaser and Langer (2003)). Miscalibration refers to the fact 
that people provide very narrow confidence intervals in various estimation tasks (Lich-
tenstein, Fischhoff and Philips (1982)). The better-than-average-effect describes the 
evidence that most people believe to achieve above average performances in various 
fields (Taylor and Brown (1988)). Both of these psychological findings can also be ap-
plied in the domain of financial markets. Therefore, I dedicated my research to those 
two aspects of overconfidence by analyzing a set of Swiss pension plan managers in an 
empirical study. A sample of Swiss pension plan managers is distinct from previous 
studies about private investors’ or mutual fund managers’ degrees of overconfidence 
and their realized performances with active management because the participants in my 
sample not only bear responsibility for their own investments but for the retirement sav-
ings of all the employees in Switzerland. Therefore an additional level of prudence from 
those participants could be expected. In contrast Odean (1998) outlines that possibly 
exactly those people who are overconfident in the domain of financial markets are those 
who are attracted by jobs that require financial decision-making. The main results of my 
first two essays show that Swiss pension plan managers are indeed overconfident. They 
provide very narrow confidence intervals when estimating returns on financial markets 
and most of them believe the active managers of their own pension plan to be above 
average. 
As previous research shows overconfidence can lead to reduced returns, increased risks 
and suboptimal financial decision-making. So it seems very important to address those 
issues in order to help investors, especially Swiss pension plans, to manage their assets 
more efficiently. 
Another important observation during my time with the City of Zurich Pension Fund is 
that investment decisions can be taken in very different ways. The investment commit-
tee of the City of Zurich Pension Fund usually discusses various ideas internally and 
then takes a decision. This is a typical example of a group decision-making process. In 
contrast some of the external asset managers the City of Zurich Pension Fund has em-
ployed rely on the decision-making of an individual, usually a senior portfolio manager. 
Today, neither psychological nor economic research offer a clear answer to the question 
whether groups outperform individuals in financial decision-making and therefore I 
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focused on this question in my third essay. The lack of an answer motivated me to de-
sign an asset allocation game on an experimental market which allows me to observe 
the decision-making process of groups and individuals in a sample of students and to 
test whether there are any significant differences between groups’ and individuals’ per-
formances.  
The main conclusion is that only groups who exchange individual information across 
group members are able to achieve better results than individuals. This has important 
implications for the decision-making processes of asset managers on financial markets 
because they should take the results of my third essay into account when organizing 
their financial decision-making structures. 
The following chapters 2, 3, and 4 contain the full version of each of my 3 essays in-
cluding the abstract, all the figures and tables, and the corresponding references.  
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2. Are Pension Fund Managers Overconfident? 
Abstract 
Empirical studies show that people tend to be overconfident about the precision of their 
knowledge, leading to miscalibration. Consistent with this, we found that on overage the 
decision makers of Swiss pension plans provide too narrow confidence intervals when 
asked to estimate past returns of various assets. Their confidence intervals are also very 
narrow in their forecasts of future returns. They are less miscalibrated, however, than 
our laypeople sample. Individual differences between the participants’ degree of 
overconfidence are large and stable across those two different tasks. In a linear 
regression model we present evidence that the size of participants’ confidence intervals 
is linked to individual characteristics. In our sample younger people with a degree from 
university and with more experience in finance provide larger intervals than older 
people without such an education and with less experience. 
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2.1 Introduction 
On average people tend to be overconfident. In particular, it is well documented that 
people exhibit overconfident behavior in financial markets. The degree of overconfi-
dence, however, seems to vary across individuals and across different domains of ques-
tions. In this paper our contribution to research is twofold. First, we investigate a special 
group, the decision-makers of Swiss pension plans who not only bear responsibility for 
their own investments but for the retirement savings of thousands of employees in Swit-
zerland. Therefore an additional level of prudence from those participants could be ex-
pected. In contrast Odean (1998) outlines that possibly exactly those people who are 
overconfident in the domain of financial markets are those who are attracted by jobs that 
require financial decision-making. We shed some light on this question by showing that 
decision-makers of Swiss pension plans are overconfident but to a lesser degree than a 
sample of laypeople. 
Second, we not only confirm the evidence for individual differences in the degree of 
overconfidence but also show that those differences are related to individual characteris-
tics. In a linear regression model we measure the impact of individual characteristics on 
overconfidence and we present evidence that younger people with a degree from univer-
sity and more experience in finance are significantly less overconfident than older par-
ticipants with less education and less experience.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews related research 
on overconfidence in general and in the domain of financial markets. Section III de-
scribes the data and the methods to measure overconfidence and introduces our linear 
regression model. Section IV presents the results for miscalibration in our sample and 
for our linear regression analysis. Section V discusses interpretations and practical im-
plications of our results and concludes. 
2.2 Related research on overconfidence 
Overconfidence is a complex phenomenon with various facets. Glaser and Weber 
(2003) differentiate between four different manifestations of overconfidence: miscali-
bration, better-than-average-effect, illusion of control and overoptimism. This paper 
concentrates only on i) miscalibration in the domain of estimating historical returns of 
financial assets and on ii) forecasting future returns.  
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People tend to overestimate the precision of their knowledge. As a result, they are mis-
calibrated in estimating and forecasting by providing too narrow confidence intervals 
(Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Philips (1982)). It has been observed that task difficulty 
and blurred feedback lead to more overconfidence (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Philips 
(1982), Griffin and Tversky (1992)). Odean (1998) argues that forecasting and estimat-
ing returns on financial markets are not easy tasks and the available feedback is blurred 
as the market prices of assets are affected by noise. So the chances to observe overcon-
fident behavior in the domain of financial markets are high.  
Current psychological research debates whether miscalibration is a stable human trait or 
only a statistical illusion (see Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and Kleinbölting (1991), Griffin and 
Tversky (1992), Erev, Wallsten and Budescu (1994), Brenner, Liberman and Tversky 
(1996) and Klayman, Soll, Gonzales-Vallejo and Barlas (1999)). As Soll and Klayman 
(2004) point out the type of question matters and tasks which involve estimations of 
confidence intervals typically lead to higher measures for miscalibration. It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to analyze miscalibration in general and with respect to different 
types of measurement. We focus on the tasks of estimation and forecasting of asset re-
turns, which are similar to tasks the decision makers of Swiss pension plans frequently 
face in their jobs and which might impact the wealth of Swiss pension plans. 
Studies show that professionals in the financial industry are subject to miscalibration. 
Russo and Schoemaker (1992) report that money managers tend to formulate too nar-
row 90% confidence intervals in a questionnaire about meta-knowledge. The partici-
pants’ subjective confidence intervals in their sample contain the correct solutions only 
in about half of the cases instead of 90% as required. Graham and Campbell (2003) ana-
lyze economic forecasts on the equity risk premium from CFOs in the USA over differ-
ent time horizons and conclude that the size of the average confidence interval is very 
narrow compared to the volatility of equity markets. Deaves, Lueders and Schroeder 
(2005) and Glaser, Weber and Langer (2003) present similar evidence in the domain of 
financial markets as the confidence intervals of the participants in their samples of pro-
fessionals capture significantly less realized returns for economic forecasts than re-
quired. They also notice that the individual degree of overconfidence is stable across 
different tasks. This result indicates that people are in general overconfident in the do-
main of financial markets and not just within particular asset classes or particular tasks. 
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It is also in line with the finding of Alpert and Raiffa (1982) who argue that people tend 
to respond similarly to the same types of questions.  
Graham, Campbell and Huang (2006) and Glaser, Weber and Langer (2005) report that 
the level of overconfidence in the domain of financial markets is different across indi-
viduals. There is no doubt that individual characteristics affect overconfidence but the 
evidence about stable relationships is ambiguous. Russo and Schoemaker (1992) report 
that professionals are generally miscalibrated but to a lesser degree than laypeople. In 
contrast Glaser, Weber and Langer (2003) find that professionals are more overconfi-
dent than students about their trend recognition abilities although they do not provide 
more accurate estimations. In a model from Odean and Gervais (2001) more experience 
is related to a lower degree of overconfidence. Inexperienced but successful investors 
are most prone to overconfidence as they self-attribute their success solely to their abili-
ties. Over time more experience will help them to better evaluate their true abilities. 
Locke and Mann (2001) confirm this theory empirically as they find no indication of 
miscalibration among highly experienced traders on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 
In light of those results we analyze if individual characteristics such as education or 
experience increase overconfidence in the domain of financial markets. 
Being overconfident can be harmful on financial markets. In a large sample of private 
investors Odean and Barber (2001) show that overconfidence leads to a higher trading 
volume and reduces portfolio returns. Guiso and Jappelli (2005) use a sample of Italian 
bank clients in which the clients, - whom the authors suppose to be more overconfident 
(people with a lower education but a higher self declared knowledge), - hold portfolios 
with lower Sharpe ratios than other clients. However it is beyond the scope of this paper 
to evaluate the portfolios and the trading activities of Swiss pension plans and we do not 
postulate any causal relationships between the degree of overconfidence of our partici-
pants and the investments of the corresponding pension plans.1   
                                                   
1
 Menkhoff, Lukas, and Ulrich Schmidt, 2005, The Use of Trading Strategies by Fund Managers: Some 
First Survey Evidence, Discussion Paper (Hannover). The authors address how overconfidence might be 
related to investment strategies of mutual fund managers. 
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2.3 Data and methods 
In total 584 questionnaires have been distributed among decision-makers of Swiss pen-
sion plans, i.e. managers and members of investment committees and 132 have been 
returned. We refer to it as the professional sample. This corresponds to a response rate 
of 22.6%. 24 questionnaires contained no confidence intervals and therefore have been 
excluded from the analysis so the professional sample consists of 108 participants (Only 
6 participants are female). 58 persons have a university degree, 36 of them in finance. 
65 attended education courses in finance for practitioners. Experience in finance and in 
pension plans is symmetrically distributed between less than 2 years and more than 25 
years, and the respondents are between 25 and 80 years old. A laypeople sample is 
based on people working for the City of Zurich in several departments not related to 
financial markets or pension plans but with a self-declared interest in financial topics. In 
total 104 persons, 19 woman and 85 men, returned a complete questionnaire so the 
sample size of the laypeople sample is 104 persons (22 questionnaires were incom-
plete). 25 of them have a degree from university but only 16 in finance or economics 
and 32 have attended courses in finance for practitioners. Two-thirds have no experi-
ence in working in financial areas but two-thirds do frequently read newspapers related 
to financial topics. The participants in the laypeople sample are between 20 and 65 
years old. 
The questionnaire for the participants in both the professional and laypeople sample 
consists of two parts. In the first part the respondents provided data about individual 
characteristics. In the second part the participants were asked to formulate two sorts of 
90% confidence intervals.2 First, 90% confidence intervals for historical annual returns 
for 6 different asset classes over the last 36 years to estimate the participant’s degree of 
miscalibration. Those questions have been worded the following way: “In this task you 
have to provide an upper and a lower boundary for the annual returns of asset class x 
over the last 36 years. Please choose the boundaries in such a way that 90% of the real-
ized single annual returns of asset class x are within your boundaries.” Second, 90% 
confidence intervals for return forecasts for 6 different asset classes for the year 2006 to 
qualitatively assess how confident the participants are about their forecasting abilities 
                                                   
2
 A full version of the questionnaire -either in German or in French - can be obtained from the first author 
of this paper.  
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given their confidence intervals. The following wording is used: “In this task you have 
to provide an upper and a lower boundary for the return of asset class x in the year 
2006. Please choose the boundaries in such a way that the realized return of asset class 
x in 2006 will be within your boundaries with a probability of 90%.”  
The period for handing in the questionnaire was from May 2006 until the beginning of 
August 2006. The returns of the different asset classes were volatile over that time pe-
riod so maybe the 90% confidence intervals were affected. A t-test reveals however that 
there are no differences between the means for 90% confidence intervals from people 
who handed in their questionnaires before or after mid of June 2006 so there is no need 
to split our samples.  
In this paper we use two different methods to judge the participant’s confidence inter-
vals. First, following an idea of Hilton (2001), we compare the participants’ subjective 
confidence intervals for annual returns with the distribution of historical annual returns 
over the last 36 years. More concretely we count the number of annual returns over the 
last 36 years that are included within the participants’ 90% confidence intervals. For 
each asset class we collected the last 36 realized historical annual returns and we simply 
cut off the 2 highest and lowest returns to approximate a 90% (precisely 88.9%) interval 
of the annual returns in each asset class. In other words 90% of the annual returns over 
the last 36 years are included in those intervals and this corresponds to 32 annual re-
turns. A miscalibrated participant will provide too narrow 90% confidence intervals and 
thus captures less than 32 annual returns of the last 36 annual returns.  
Second, we analyze the implied volatility of the participants’ confidence intervals where 
we make use of a relationship that Pearson and Tukey (1965) describe. With the term 
implied volatility we refer to a relationship between the 95% and 5% return quantile 
(which corresponds to a 90% interval) and the standard deviation as is given in equation 
(1).  
 
Standard deviation = (95% return quantile – 5% return quantile) / 3.25  (1) 
Like in the first approach we then compare the participants’ answers with historical 
data, i.e. the participants’ implied volatilities in their confidence intervals with the his-
torically implied volatility of each asset class based on the annual returns over the last 
36 years. Volatility is a popular way to express uncertainty about future returns of an 
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asset class and the higher the volatility the broader is the spectrum in which the realiza-
tion of the future return will fall with a certain probability. If a participant formulates 
confidence intervals with very low implied volatilities we interpret this as an indication 
that he is miscalibrated. The historically implied volatility of the annual returns there-
fore serves as a guideline to judge the size of the implied volatilities. 
We do not apply those two methods to measure miscalibration in the forecasting task 
because an ex post comparison between a subject’s forecast interval for the return of an 
asset class in the year 2006 and the accuracy of his answer might be biased and unreli-
able. The reason is that the measurement is heavily dependent on the future outcome, 
i.e. the realized return in 2006. The annual return in 2006 represents only one single 
observation which is not necessarily representative for the participant’s true level of 
overconfidence. Returns close to the historical mean will lead to the conclusion that few 
participants are miscalibrated whereas extremely positive or negative returns would 
probably fall out of almost everybody’s confidence intervals. Nevertheless forecast in-
tervals provide information about how participants evaluate their own abilities to fore-
cast future returns on financial markets and narrow confidence intervals reflect a high 
conviction.  
To analyze the relationships between confidence interval sizes and individual character-
istics we use a linear regression model with 4 predictors. We differentiate between 3 
sorts of education: a degree from university, practical financial education, and no such 
education, resulting in 2 dummy variables. We further apply a predictor for experience 
– an aggregation of experience in finance and in pension plans – and age. Some of those 
4 predictors are positively correlated but never above a level of 0.6. Gender is not in-
cluded in the regression model as the number of females is too low. 
In the analysis of confidence intervals across all participants we present median values 
as there are a few outliers that have big impacts on the mean. In the application of the 
linear regressions analysis we use the logarithm of the confidence intervals and the cor-
responding boundaries to mitigate such outlier effects. However the results do not sub-
stantially change if we analyze the non-transformed data. To aggregate confidence in-
tervals of different asset classes we normalize the data by calculating the z scores of the 
participants log intervals. We report R2 to provide information about the amount of 
variance our regressions explain. No significant interaction effects have been identified 
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within the variables for our regression model so we do not include interaction variables. 
Cooks Distance values (Cooks D) indicate no significant effects of outliers. 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Estimation of historical returns  
The median 90% confidence intervals of professionals only capture around 60%~80% 
of the past annual returns in each asset class.3 This is evidence that professionals in our 
sample are miscalibrated in the median because their confidence intervals were meant to 
contain 90% of the annual returns over the last 36 years. The laypeople sample provides 
even narrower boundaries for almost all asset classes so laypeople are more miscali-
brated than professionals. A Mann-Whitney test however reveals that the differences 
between the confidence interval sizes are not significant except for 2 asset classes. The 
bars in figure 2.1 show the median lower and the median upper boundaries for the con-
fidence intervals in the professional and the laypeople sample for historical return esti-
mates in 6 different asset classes. Those are Swiss and world equities, CHF bonds, gold, 
oil and the CHF-USD exchange rate. The bars with the diagonal lines represent the dis-
tribution of 90% of all annual returns over the last 36 years for those 6 asset classes and 
serve as a guideline to judge the size of the participants’ confidence intervals. It can be 
seen that in the median the professionals and the laypeople underestimate the downside 
risk but also the upside potential in almost all asset classes. That explains why medians 
for 90% confidence intervals from both samples are narrower than the historical 90% 
intervals for annual returns over the last 36 years.4 
                                                   
3
 In the analysis of confidence intervals for historical returns we only include participants who provided 
negative lower boundaries in the confidence intervals for the asset class world equities. The reason is to 
not bias the study with respondents who might have misunderstood the question (i.e. provided a 90% 
confidence interval for the annualized mean return over the whole 36 years instead of a 90% confidence 
interval for all annual returns in that period). In total 56 participants from the professional sample are 
included. If we included the confidence intervals from all the participants, miscalibration would appear to 
be much higher but arguably may be spurious. In the analysis of confidence intervals for return forecasts 
we include all participants. 
4
 We acknowledge that an analysis of only the size of the participants’ confidence intervals does not pro-
vide any information about the accuracy, i.e. how much the lower and upper boundaries of a subjective 
confidence interval deviate from the historical intervals. Mann-Whitney tests show that the professional 
sample provides significantly more accurate boundaries for every asset class than the laypeople. 
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Table 2-1: Implied volatilities of confidence intervals  
The table 2.1 shows the implied volatilities of the confidence intervals from the profes-
sionals and the laypeople respectively for historical returns for each asset class. It also 
contains the historically implied volatility in each asset class over the last 36 years and 
the ratio of the participants’ implied volatilities and historically implied volatilities. The 
stars indicate if the differences between implied volatilities from participants’ confi-
dence intervals are significantly different than the historically implied intervals in each 
asset class.  
 
 
Figure 2-1: Confidence intervals for historical returns 
The figure 2.1 shows the median lower and the median upper boundaries for the confi-
dence intervals in the professional and the laypeople sample for historical return esti-
mates of 6 different asset classes as well as the upper and lower boundaries of the real-
ized return of those asset classes over the last 36 years. 
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Further indication for miscalibration is given by a comparison of the implied volatilities 
embedded in the confidence intervals and the implied volatility of historical returns. 
Table 2.1 shows the implied volatilities of the confidence intervals from the profession-
als and the laypeople respectively for historical returns for each asset class. We see that 
the implied volatilities in both samples are lower than the historically implied volatil-
ities in all asset classes and the difference is highly significant for equities and bonds. 
Another evidence for miscalibration is given by the fact that more than 70% of the pro-
fessionals and 75% of the laypeople provide 90% confidence intervals which are nar-
rower than the historical intervals on each asset class.  
An unexpected but interesting result is the fact that the professionals as well as the lay-
people have a good feeling for the relative risk of each asset class. The ratios between 
the historical intervals and the subjective confidence intervals are close to 0.7 and 0.6 
respectively in all asset classes as the last two lines in table 2.1 show. Those ratios are 
calculated by dividing the historically implied volatility by the median implied volatility 
of the participants’ confidence intervals. So both the professional and the laypeople 
sample are well informed about the relative risk of each asset class or in other words are 
equally miscalibrated across the historical returns of different asset classes. 
2.4.2 Return forecasts 
Now we turn to the participants 90% confidence intervals for return forecasts for the 
year 2006. We asked for return forecasts in Swiss equities, CHF bonds, the participants’ 
own pension plan, and the average Swiss pension plan. The implied volatilities of our 
professional sample for Swiss equities (3.1%), CHF bonds (1.2%) and the two types of 
pension plan returns (1.5% for each forecast) are difficult to compare to reasonable 
benchmarks but we have the impression that those confidence intervals are very narrow 
relative to the historically implied volatilities in table 2.1. So the participants in our 
sample express a high conviction about their own forecasting abilities because they 
choose very narrow upper and lower boundaries in their forecasting intervals.5 Similar 
to the estimation of historical returns laypeople provide narrower confidence intervals 
than professionals but in the forecasting task Mann-Whitney tests confirm that the con-
                                                   
5
 We acknowledge that the participants provided their answers between May 2006 and August 2006 and 
it might be the case that they already used the available information for the year 2006. But even then the 
upper and lower boundaries are on average very close to each other. 
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fidence interval sizes are significantly different. So the professionals express less confi-
dence into their own forecast abilities than the laypeople and on average they share a 
more conservative view with respect to downside risk but expect a comparable upside 
potential.  
In line with the observation of Alpert and Raiffa (1982) the participants in both samples 
express very stable answering patterns when providing 90% confidence intervals for 
different asset classes. The correlation in the professional sample (laypeople sample) for 
forecast intervals ranges from 0.72 to 0.92 (0.47 to 0.89) and for the historical intervals 
the range lies between 0.33 and 0.92 (0.44 and 0.77). Even the correlations between 
forecasts intervals and historical intervals are always positively correlated with an aver-
age of 0.32 (0.18). Providing narrow confidence intervals seems to be a stable trait 
across individuals regardless of the asset class and the type of estimation.  
We can summarize our results so far by saying that the decision-makers of Swiss pen-
sion plans as well as a sample of laypeople are miscalibrated when estimating historical 
returns on financial markets. They also express a high conviction in their forecasting 
abilities as they provide very narrow confidence intervals for future returns but the ef-
fect among professionals is less extreme than across laypeople and professionals have 
more conservative expectations. Furthermore the participants in both samples are 
roughly equally miscalibrated across all asset classes and express stable confidence in-
terval patterns when forecasting returns on financial markets. The next section addresses 
the relationships between individual characteristics and the degree of miscalibration 
with a linear regression model. 
2.4.3 Linear regressions 
Across all asset classes in both tasks not only correlations but also Cronbach Alphas are 
very high. For the professionals (laypeople) forecast intervals they are at 0.88 (0.86) and 
for the historical intervals at 0.84 (0.84). That allows for an aggregation of the confi-
dence intervals of the different asset classes in each task to define the dependent vari-
ables in our linear regression models.6 The dependent variables are the normalized log 
values of the participants’ 90% confidence intervals for forecasts and historical returns 
divided into professional and laypeople samples. The first two predictors are mutually 
                                                   
6
 All linear regressions with single asset classes as dependent variables are available on request. 
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exclusive dummy variables for the different types of education, i.e. holding a degree 
from university or attendance of practical financial education. Participants with both a 
university degree and a practical finance education were considered as people with uni-
versity degree to mitigate double counting. The third predictor reflects a participants’ 
experience in finance or pension plans and can take values from 1 (no experience) to 7 
(more than 25 years of experience). The last predictor can also take values from 1 (be-
low 25 years) to 7 (above 65 years) and reflects the range of a participants' age. The last 
two rows contain the R2 of the regression models for each type of confidence interval as 
well as its F-value.  
Table 2-2: Linear regression models on confidence interval sizes 
Table 2.2 shows the standardized Beta and T values of the predictors in our linear re-
gression models for professionals’ and laypeople’s forecasts and historical estimations 
as well as R2 and F values for the our 4 different linear regression models. 
 
 
Our regression model works well for the professional sample with a R2 of 13.9% for the 
forecast intervals and 32.9% for the historical intervals. It also explains 19% of the 
variation in the confidence intervals for laypeople’s forecasts but it fails to relate our 
predictors to the 90% confidence intervals for historical returns in the laypeople sample. 
Having a degree from university is significantly related to broader confidence intervals 
in all asset classes. In contrast practical financial education is not significantly related to 
the interval sizes. In line with the model from Odean and Gervais (2001) the variable for 
experience tends to reduce overconfidence as professionals with more financial or pen-
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sion plan experience provide significantly broader confidence intervals. Age is related 
to narrower confidence intervals as older people provide significantly narrower confi-
dence intervals.  
To summarize, our regression analysis indicates that older people without a degree from 
university and with little experience in finance or pension plans provide significantly 
narrower confidence intervals for returns on financial markets than younger people with 
a degree from university and more experience.  
2.5 Discussion and conclusion 
We confirm that people are overconfident in the domain of financial markets but pro-
vide new evidence that this is also the case in a sample of decision-makers of Swiss 
pension plans. So we want to emphasize two practical issues related to overconfidence 
in the domain of financial markets that might apply to several pension plans and other 
investors. 
First, an overconfidently biased perception of low risks in a volatile asset class like for 
example equities could increase its perceived attractivity. This might then result in an 
overweight of that asset class and exposes a pension plan’s portfolio more to downside 
risks but the overconfident decision-makers might be unaware of that risk. De Long, 
Shleifer, Summers and Waldman (1990) present a theoretical model to demonstrate that 
noise traders with erroneous stochastic beliefs (like for example miscalibrated investors) 
take excessive risk and gain less expected utility than rational investors. Having said 
that we point out that the participants in our sample provided too narrow confidence 
intervals for all asset classes and not only for more volatile ones so we cannot general-
ize the argument that high risk assets are overweighted. So further research is needed to 
address the relationship between overconfidence and the weighting of risky asset in a 
strategic asset allocation. 
The second issue is related to present findings of other authors who demonstrate that 
overconfidence influences trading decisions of investors. In those studies overconfi-
dence is a drag on performance either because of higher transaction costs due to an in-
creased trading volume (Odean (1999)) or because investors misperceive the true prob-
abilities of market situations and over- or underreact (Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrah-
manyam (1998)). Tactical trading always generates additional transaction costs that 
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have to be compensated by higher returns but so far academic research rejects the thesis 
that tactical trading, often referred to as timing, pays off in general. Daniel, Grinblatt, 
Titman and Wermers (1997) report no systematic timing success for mutual funds and 
Blake, Lehman and Timmermann (1999) report that UK pension plans have on average 
no timing skills. 
To put our results into perspective Yaniv and Foster (1997) argue that there is a trade-
off between accuracy and informativeness when providing confidence intervals. Narrow 
confidence intervals usually provide more information than large but accurate intervals. 
We can not rule out that the participants in both of our samples want to provide very 
informative confidence intervals, especially in the forecasting task, knowing that those 
might not be totally accurate. We also take in to account that we can not relate the an-
swers of our professionals to the investments of a particular pension plan because we 
asked all participants to express their personal views in our questionnaire and not the 
views of their pension plans. 
More in depth research is needed to model the relationship between individual charac-
teristics and overconfidence but one straightforward thesis to explain why people tend 
not to be homogenously miscalibrated is the effect of perceived task difficulty. Task 
difficulty can not be measured in our questionnaire on an absolute basis. But it might be 
the case that older people with less education and less experience find it more difficult 
to come up with appropriate confidence intervals for asset returns on financial markets 
than younger people with a better education and more financial experience. According 
to Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Philips (1982) a higher level of task difficulty is linked to 
a higher level of miscalibration and this is in line with our observations. However, the 
unexplained variance in our model indicates that other factors are necessary to explain 
individual differences in miscalibration in the domain of financial markets, which needs 
further exploration. 
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3. Overconfidence and Active Management: 
An Empirical Study across Swiss Pension Plans 
Abstract 
Pension plans in Switzerland favour active management over indexing to implement 
their strategic asset allocation. Empirical surveys show, however, that their success in 
the past has been below expectations as the median performance of Swiss pension plans 
in domestic and international equities is below market indices even gross of fees. The 
results of this paper’s survey across decision-makers of Swiss pension plans sheds some 
light on why active management is still so popular across Swiss pension plans. On aver-
age the participants in the sample are prone to the better-than-average-effect. A majority 
expects their managers and their overall pension plan to outperform the other survey 
participants in the future. The subjective perceptions of the own skill level relative to 
the competitors can explain the popularity of active management across Swiss pension 
plans.  
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3.1 Introduction 
The goal to be above average is deeply rooted in human nature and can be observed in 
many different domains. Studies in psychology show that people also tend to have the 
illusion that they are capable of delivering above average performances in various tasks 
(Taylor and Brown (1988)) despite having no adequate means to compare themselves 
with a representative average. This is often referred to as one facet of overconfidence 
called the “better-than-average-effect” and financial markets are no exception with re-
spect to such an effect across investors. 
In contrast to other domains an adequate measure of the average performance is easily 
available on financial markets as data about various broad market-capitalized indices 
are freely accessible for investors. However beating the average is difficult. As Sharpe 
(1991) demonstrated, active management is a zero-sum game and empirical evidence 
shows that only a minor percentage of all investors are able to beat the performance of 
broad market indices net of fees in the long run. On average Swiss pension plans are no 
exception as they have failed to beat equity market index returns, too. Nevertheless the 
lure of potential outperformance ensures active management remains very popular 
across Swiss pension plans and the decision-makers express surprisingly high confi-
dence to beat their peers in the future. The better-than-average-effect can explain the 
gap between Swiss pension plans’ expectations about their future success and their real-
ized historical success.  
The contribution to research of this paper is twofold. First, evidence is presented that 
the implementation of the strategic asset allocation with active managers is more popu-
lar but historically not more successful than indexing from a risk-return perspective 
across Swiss pension plans. In the last couple of years Swiss pension plans achieved on 
average lower returns than broad market indices in domestic as well as international 
equities. The second contribution deals with expectations concerning the future per-
formance of their own pension plans in a sample of decision-makers at Swiss pension 
plans. Their answers to the author’s questionnaire reveal that they expect their own pen-
sion plans as well as their managers to outperform the other participants’ in the sample 
and to be able to select above average managers. Such optimistic expectations are puz-
zling when the average historical performance is taken into account and indicates that 
the participants in the sample are indeed prone to the better-than-average-effect. 
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It is far beyond the scope of this paper to take a general view on the advantages and 
disadvantages of active management for Swiss pension plans. Successful active man-
agement depends on an array of circumstances like goals, skills, expectations, risk-
aversions and constraints. So there is no way to argue for an optimal degree of active 
management in general because there is too much heterogeneity across Swiss pension 
plans with respect to those different circumstances. However this paper argues that sus-
ceptibility to the better-than-average-effect can bias the judgment of the own skills rela-
tive to other investors and therefore can explain the heavy reliance of the Swiss pension 
plan industry on active management in equities despite the lack of success in the past.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the environment 
and framework Swiss pension plans are operating in. Section III reviews related re-
search on active management with a special focus on pension plan performances and on 
the better-than-average-effect. Section IV describes the data including the answers from 
the author’s questionnaire for the decision-makers of Swiss pension plans. Section V 
presents the performance of Swiss pension plans relative to market indices and the 
proneness to the better-than-average-effect in the sample. Together with the conclu-
sions, section VI discusses implications of the results and addresses alternative explana-
tions for the popularity of active management across Swiss pension plans. 
3.2 Swiss pension funds 
A sample of Swiss pension plans is distinct from previous studies about private inves-
tors’ or mutual funds’ preferences and performances of active management because the 
participants in this sample not only bear responsibility for their own investments but for 
the retirement savings of the employees in Switzerland. According to a study of the 
Swiss National Bank for the year 2004 ( see SNB (2006)) roughly half of all the peo-
ples’ wealth in Switzerland, around CHF 500 billion, is managed in the second pillar, 
i.e. in the hands of Swiss pension plans.7 So it is in the interest of the working people in 
Switzerland that Swiss pension plans take wise and prudent financial decisions. 
The pension funds under examination are segregated funded occupational pension 
schemes from the private and the public sector in Switzerland. Throughout their work-
                                                   
7
. In September 2006 estimates for the wealth in Switzerland’s second pillar are at CHF 650 Bn 
Swisscanto, 2006, Schweizer Pensionskassen 2006, (Swisscanto).. 
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ing life Swiss employees of companies or public institutions provide contributions to 
their pension funds which accumulate over time and then are used to fund retirement 
payments to pensioners. It is the goal of the pension funds to manage those inflows in a 
way to guarantee the payments to the pensioners without imposing high contributions to 
the current employees. The pension funds are provided by a public or private employer 
(the sponsor) and are either defined benefit or defined contribution plans or a hybrid of 
those two. Defined benefit plans offer the employee guaranteed payments in retirement 
from the sponsor usually defined as a percentage of the employee’s final salary. The 
risk of funding such a guaranteed payment is borne by the sponsor. By contrast defined 
contribution plans convert the value of an employee’s savings in the pension fund into 
an annuity at retirement. In a defined contribution plan the employee bears the risk. In 
Switzerland there are many hybrid schemes that contain elements of both basic types of 
schemes. Whether it is the employee or the sponsor that carries the higher burden of 
risk, there is no historical evidence to suggest that either type of scheme has more or 
less success using active management, nor that there are significant differences in the 
level of popularity of active management between the two (Frauenlob (1998)).  
In Switzerland the law forces the board of trustees to take decisions about the strategic 
asset allocation of their pension plan and they cannot delegate this responsibility. How-
ever they can rely on third party knowledge in the elaboration of the strategic asset allo-
cation. Members of the board of trustees are not necessarily investment professionals 
but rather people who represent stakeholders of the sponsor and have been elected into 
the board to lobby their voters’ interest. The chosen asset allocation of every pension 
plan has to be in line with the Swiss regulatory framework.8 The implementation of the 
chosen asset allocation in a particular pension plan is usually delegated to an investment 
committee which consists of delegates from the board of trustees and / or investment 
professionals. Most of the investment committees of Swiss pension plans consist of 
three to six members and meet between four and ten times per year. The main responsi-
bility of such an investment committee is to appoint asset managers and to take tactical 
decisions within the guidelines defined by the board of trustees. Investment committees 
typically decide whether the day-to-day management is delegated to an external asset 
                                                   
8
 Verordnung über die berufliche Alters-, Hinterlassenen- und Invalidenvorsorge (BVV 2), articles 50 to 
59. 
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manager or whether in-house managers are hired. They also have the option to delegate 
certain tactical decisions to in-house managers. So the decision about the role of active 
management in the implementation of the strategic asset allocation lies in the hands of 
either the investment committee members or the in-house managers.  
In order to analyze explanations for the popularity of active management across Swiss 
pension plans a sample of investment committee members and internal managers seems 
to be appropriate. However, the important role played by consultants and the advice 
they give to pension fund professionals cannot be overlooked. Indeed, it would be inac-
curate to suggest that all decisions are taken independently by the investment commit-
tees. According to a survey from Lusenti (2003) across 195 public and private Swiss 
pension plans 38% use third party advice in strategic decisions. Only 20% of the plans 
in the same sample indicate that they never work with external consultants. Neverthe-
less an investment committee ultimately bears the responsibility so it is their decision 
that matters. 
3.3 Related research 
This paper does not go into detail on the ongoing debate about the success achievable 
through active management but a few introductory phrases shed some light on the basic 
framework in which the results in this paper have to be viewed. Then the historical per-
formance of pension plans in various countries relative to market indices will be ad-
dressed. The last part of this section focuses on the better-than-average-effect whose 
roots are in the psychological literature.  
Decades ago the discussion started with the development of the CAPM (Sharpe (1964)), 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis by Fama (1970) and its weaknesses pointed out by Roll 
(1977) or Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). Since then the basic question has been whether 
a broad market index represents a better investment opportunity than an actively-
managed portfolio. Carhart (1997), Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997) and 
Malkiel (2004) all present empirical evidence that most mutual fund managers are un-
able to deliver a persistent outperformance versus a broad market index net of fees. By 
the same token there is no doubt that some active managers delivered an outperfor-
mance versus market indices (Siegel, Kroner and Clifford (2001)) – maybe due to luck, 
maybe due to skill - and investing in such managers would have yielded a significantly 
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higher return than purely indexed exposure to markets. So how did the pension plan 
industry perform so far?  
Frauenlob (1998) describes investment strategies for Swiss pension plans and reports 
that pension plans with a more active implementation of the strategic asset allocation do 
not perform better than other pension plans. But he points out that most of the pension 
plans did not outperform broad market indices net of fees in different asset classes and 
over different time periods. Characteristics of a pension plan such as size, assets under 
management or pension scheme type offered no explanation for the degree of active 
management in his study. The results of previous studies in other countries about the 
success of active managers for pension funds are mixed but the majority does not favor 
active management. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) report that from 1983 to 
1989 most of the active equity managers in a sample of 769 funds that managed assets 
of US pension plans delivered an underperformance and in total they underperformed 
the S&P 500 by 1.3% p.a. gross of fees. In contrast Berzins and Trzcinka (2005) report 
that a sample of 549 US equity portfolios at US pension plans outperformed the S&P 
500 by a mean of 0.65% p.a. gross of fees from 1993 to 2003. For a sample of UK pen-
sion funds Blake, Lehman and Timmermann (1999) conclude that the pension plans 
have no selection or timing skills. In a later report Blake, Lehman and Timmermann 
(2002) demonstrated that in a sample of 306 UK pension funds over the period from 
1986 to 1994 the median pension plan underperformed a broad market index by 0.15% 
p.a. in UK equities and 0.06% p.a. in international equities gross of fees. On a total port-
folio level 138 UK pension plans were able to realize an outperformance versus an ag-
gregated benchmark and 168 delivered an underperformance. The authors further ob-
served a low cross-sectional variability in returns indicating that the UK pension plan 
managers tend to take low relative risk versus market indices. In a sample of 2175 eq-
uity portfolios of UK pension funds Tonks (2001) reports an average underperformance 
of 0.006% p.a. against the FTSE All Share Index gross of fees from March 1983 to De-
cember 1997. However he points out that there is significant persistence across outper-
formers as well as across underperformers. Stanko (2003) reports that on average active 
management added value to the performance of 21 public pension plans in Poland in the 
period from June 1999 to March 2003 on an overall portfolio level but no details about 
single asset classes are available.  
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From the realized performance of pension plans around the world we now turn to the 
psychological literature which offers various insights into the better-than-average-effect. 
The better-than-average-effect is one aspect in the field of overconfidence which is a 
complex phenomenon with various facets. In the domain of financial markets Glaser 
and Weber (2007) differentiate between 4 different manifestations of overconfidence; 
miscalibration, better-than-average-effect, illusion of control and overoptimism. This 
paper only concentrates on the better-than-average-effect because it is directly observ-
able in a questionnaire, it is relevant in the domain of financial markets as Graham, 
Campbell and Huang (2006) outline and it serves as one explanation for the popularity 
of active management across Swiss pension plans.  
The better-than-average-effect was first observed in psychology. Svenson (1981) notes 
that more than 80% of the participants in a survey believe themselves to be above aver-
age with respect to their driving skills. Taylor and Brown (1988) demonstrate that peo-
ple generally tend to be prone to the better-than-average-effect in many fields as they 
believe their skills and abilities to be above average despite the absence of reliable in-
formation about their true level of skill compared to others. In a later paper (Taylor and 
Brown (1994)) they confirm their thesis and point out that being overly optimistic is 
usually increasing the well-being of an individual. So from a psychological standpoint 
being prone to the better-than-average can be seen as rather healthy and definitely non-
pathological but in the domain of financial markets it can lead to overoptimistically bi-
ased expectations about the own abilities and the own performance in the future. 
Camerer and Lovallo (1999) present evidence from an experimental market that roughly 
70% of the participants in their sample are prone to the better-than-average-effect in a 
market entry game when relying on the subjective perception of the own skills relative 
to the competitors in the game. They further report that the participants on average lose 
money due to their propensity to the better-than-average-effect and their overestimation 
of their own skills and so this results in financial decisions that lower their wealth.  
In a theoretical model De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman (1991) show that 
overconfident investors can survive on financial markets but tend to take more risk and 
gain less expected utility than rational investors. Kyle and Wang (1997) show with their 
model that employing overconfident managers can be the best strategy, in the context of 
game theory, as both participants face a prisoner’s dilemma. However the choice of an 
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overconfident manager does not lead to an efficient outcome for both players. It is ac-
knowledged that these models are applied directly to investors and not to decision-
makers who have the choice of delegating the portfolio management to an external asset 
manager. However the point is to show that overconfident market participants can theo-
retically survive on financial markets but do not achieve the best risk-adjusted perform-
ance. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that overconfidence could lead to a 
preference for active management in a pension plan despite the fact that it might deliver 
returns below a market index. They point out that overconfidence about selection skills 
used to identify good active managers can explain the high percentage of active man-
agement within US pension plans.  
Empirically Odean and Barber (2000) and Guiso and Jappelli (2005) demonstrate in 
samples of private investors that high trading volumes can reduce the performance re-
sults substantially due to increased trading costs. It seems fair to assume that the trading 
costs for Swiss pension plans are lower than for private investors but basically higher 
trading volumes cause more transactions costs for pension plans as well. 
There is no doubt that it is very difficult to beat the average performance on financial 
markets in the long run. But maybe some investors are not really aware of it because the 
better-than-average-effect biases their perceptions about the own skill level and the 
thoughness of competition. In the next sections it will be analyzed if this is also the case 
for Swiss pension plans.  
3.4 Data and methods 
In this paper the focus is on the implementation of a strategic asset allocation with ac-
tive managers instead of indexers across Swiss pension plans. The availability of index 
instruments today gives the decision-makers of Swiss pension plans a true choice be-
tween active managers and indexers when implementing the strategic asset allocation 
for traditional asset classes like equities or bonds. The choice of a strategic asset alloca-
tion itself can in fact also be regarded as active management as the board of trustees of a 
pension plan has to take active decisions. However for the strategic asset allocation of a 
Swiss pension plan there is no market index that could be used as a default portfolio so 
there is no true choice between active managers and indexers. Therefore the focus is 
only on the performance of Swiss pension plans within asset classes and not across total 
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pension plan portfolios. Timing skills of pension plans will also be excluded from the 
analysis in this paper because meaningful data is not available. 
In order to have enough observations and a true choice between active management and 
indexing the paper only analyzes the performances in three asset classes. Those are do-
mestic and international equities as well as CHF bonds. We then compare the pension 
plans’ average and median performances in those asset classes with well established 
market indices. For domestic equities the Swiss Performance Index (SPI) is applied as a 
benchmark, for international equities the MSCI World Index family is used, and for 
CHF bonds the Swiss Bond Index (SBI). Because Swiss pension plans are tax exempt, 
the loss due to taxes on dividends is in most of the cases marginal and so a total return 
index is a fair comparison. It might be the case that many pension plans in the sample 
do not use those indices as their benchmarks. But the choice of a benchmark is also an 
active decision that investment committees or managers have to take and the MSCI in-
dex family, the SPI and the SBI can be seen as reasonable and investable default solu-
tions for those asset classes. 
To collect data about the absolute and relative performance of Swiss pension plans 
within asset classes the paper relies on two different types of empirical surveys. First, 
on annual studies from Lusenti Partners (Lusenti (2007), Lusenti (2006) and Lusenti 
(2005)) which are based on a sample of 130, 123 and 123 Swiss pension plans respec-
tively. These surveys present mean and median realized annual performances across 
different asset classes which can be compared to market index returns. Second, on the 
performance data from the ASIP Performance Comparison across 60 to 73 Swiss pen-
sion plans over different annual periods (ASIP (2000-2006)). The availability of data 
about returns of pension plan portfolios9 in different asset classes in the ASIP survey 
allows for a comparison between each pension plan’s performances within the same 
asset class relative to a market index. While the Lusenti surveys directly collect all their 
information from the pension plans, ASIP uses financial data from the global custodians 
of the participating pension plans. This guarantees for generally-accepted calculation 
methods in the ASIP data and allows for a more homogenous set of performance data to 
                                                   
9
 A pension plan portfolio is defined as a single mandate to an in-house or external asset manager within a 
certain asset class or a consolidation of single mandates of a pension plan within an asset class. There is 
no further data available about the performances of each single mandate that is included in the consolida-
tion of mandates of a pension plan.  
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compare. ASIP relies on returns gross of fees whereas Lusenti requests data net of fees. 
This has to be taken into account when interpreting the results.  
This paper does not assume that one of those surveys is singularly representative for 
Swiss pension plans because both include only a small part all pension plans in Switzer-
land.10 However in terms of assets under management the samples from Lusenti include 
roughly CHF 200 billion in each year while the samples in ASIP contain assets of 
roughly CHF 80 billion in 2000 to CHF 160 billion in 2006. This reflects one third and 
one quarter respectively of total asset under management in the second pillar of Switzer-
land. The ratio between participating pension plans and assets under management shows 
that rather large pension plans participate in the ASIP and the Lusenti survey so a size 
bias cannot be ruled out. But the results of this paper are on the conservative side as 
larger pension plans tend to index more assets than smaller funds according to Lusenti 
(2003). So this paper tends to underestimates the popularity of active management 
across Swiss pension plans. There is a self selection bias in the samples because there is 
no obligation to participate in either the Lusenti or the ASIP surveys. It is plausible that 
only successful and above average pension plans are incentivised to participate in those 
surveys. The incentive to participate in the ASIP survey might be additionally limited 
by the fact that a fee is charged for the participation. In light of this bias the results with 
respect to historical success with active management rather overestimate the success of 
the overall pension plan industry in Switzerland. There is a certain overlap in the sam-
ples because some pension plans participate in the Lusenti as well as in the ASIP survey 
but is not quantifiable because data about the participants in the Lusenti study is not 
public. An analysis between the performance of defined contribution and defined bene-
fit plans is not valid in this paper due to the low number of defined contribution plans in 
the sample but in line with Frauenlob (1998) no indications for differences appeared in 
the available data. 
In order to analyze the better-than-average-effect across decision-makers of Swiss pen-
sion plans the author constructed a specific questionnaire that has been distributed to 
large sample of investment committee members and managers at Swiss pension plans. 
In total 584 questionnaires have been distributed and 132 have been returned. This cor-
                                                   
10
 In 2004 BFS, Bundesamt für Statistik, 2004, Pensionskassenstatistik, (Bundesamt für Statistik BFS, 
Neuchatel). counted 2935 pension plans in Switzerland. There is a decreasing trend in the last 10 years. 
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responds to a response rate of 22.6%. A majority of the participants’ pension plans are 
represented in either the Lusenti or the ASIP survey. 24 questionnaires contained in-
complete information and therefore have been excluded from the analysis. As a result 
the professional sample consists of 108 participants (56 investment committee mem-
bers, 52 managers) who represent a total of 39 Swiss pension plans (22 Defined Benefit, 
8 Defined Contribution, 2 Hybrids, and 7 unspecified). 
To measure the better-than-average-effect the participants were given two different 
tasks in a questionnaire. In the first task they were asked about their expectations with 
respect to their own pension plans’ future success relative to the other participants in the 
sample. The questions in that part were about i) the chances of their pension plan to find 
above average active managers in the future, ii) the likelihood of their pension plan to 
achieve an above average risk-adjusted return in the future, and iii) the chances their 
internal and external managers would outperform the other active managers of Swiss 
pension plans in the sample in the future. An exact wording of the questions is provided 
in appendix I. To answer those questions the participants had to tick a box on a Likert 
scale from 1 (clearly below average) to 7 (clearly above average). The possibility of 4 
(average) is included as many participants probably would choose this option. The par-
ticipants were well informed about their competitors in this sample as this was explicitly 
stated in the questionnaire. In the second part the participants had to provide subjective 
confidence intervals to forecast the returns of different asset classes for the calendar 
year 2006 that contain the realized return with a probability of 90%. A comparison 
across the lower and upper boundaries of those confidence intervals provides informa-
tion about the participants’ expected returns of pension plan portfolios.11 In addition 
they had to provide a self evaluation of the accuracy of their own forecasts versus those 
of the other participants.  
                                                   
11
 No comparisons of implied returns from subjective confidence intervals are made because the mean of 
a confidence interval could be a biased result because the participants might have a skewed distribution in 
mind. 
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3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Historical performance of Swiss pension plans 
In the annual surveys from Lusenti for the years 2004 to 2006 and ASIP from 2000 to 
2006 there is no indication of outperformance versus market indices across Swiss pen-
sion plans. Table 3.1 provides an overview of the median performances of Swiss pen-
sion plans in different asset classes according to those two surveys. The median was 
favored over the mean to mitigate outlier effects.  
Table 3-1:Past performance of Swiss pension plans 
For each asset class the top rows show the sample median returns of the Lusenti Part-
ners survey and the second rows the sample median returns for the ASIP Performance 
Comparison. The last rows each present the returns of market indices for the asset 
classes. The last 2 rows in the table present the returns of the MSCI World Index in 
CHF inclusive Switzerland and exclusive Switzerland. The reason to show both indices 
is that the treatment of Swiss equities in a world equity index is different across Swiss 
pension plans and also across the surveys from Lusenti Partners and ASIP. Some plans 
include Swiss equities within the universe of world equities and others do not.  
 
 
The first three rows show the median annual returns according to the Lusenti and the 
ASIP survey as well as the return of the Swiss Bond Index (SBI) domestic. Rows four 
to six and seven to ten contain the median annual returns for Swiss and international 
equities of the pension plans and for the market indices. Except for the median returns 
in the ASIP sample for CHF bonds in 2000 and 2003, Swiss equities in 2001 and for-
eign equities in 2000 and 2006, Swiss pension plans have never outperformed the corre-
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sponding market index neither net of fees (Lusenti) nor gross of fees (ASIP). In most of 
the years the median from ASIP underperforms the annual return of the market index by 
roughly 0.5% to 1.5%.  
An analysis of all portfolios from Swiss pension plans that participate in the ASIP sur-
vey confirms that most portfolios in the asset classes Swiss equities, world equities and 
CHF bonds do not outperform a market index gross of fees. Table 3.2 shows in columns 
one, three and five the rank of a market index with respect to the return for each asset 
class within the universe of portfolios across all pension plans in the ASIP survey over 
different time periods. For example the SPI’s return over the last 36 months was ranked 
14 within a universe of 46 portfolios in the asset class Swiss equities. So 32 of all the 
portfolios delivered a lower return than the SPI gross of fees and 13 had a higher return. 
The returns of indices in all analyzed asset classes are always in the better half of the 
ASIP pension plan universe except for CHF bonds in the period from June 05 to June 
06.  
One might argue that the pension plans in the samples from ASIP manage the asset 
classes with a lower volatility than the market indices and therefore achieve better risk-
adjusted returns. The columns two, four and six of table 3.2 list the rank of the market 
indices’ Sharpe Ratios for each asset class for the last 36 and 60 months.  
Table 3-2: Rank of market indices in the pension plan universe 
The table 3.2 lists the ranks of market indices with respect to returns and Sharpe Ratios 
for three different asset classes, Swiss and world equities and CHF bonds in the sample 
of the ASIP Performance Comparison between different time periods. Each row shows 
the rank of an index for a past time period and the number of pension plan portfolios in 
the sample. To compute the rank total return indices are used. For Swiss equities the 
Swiss Performance Index (SPI), for world equities the MSCI World Index and for CHF 
bonds the Swiss Bond Index (SBI) domestic. The risk free rate is the 12 month money 
market return according to the Swiss National Bank (SNB) for the period from June 
30th, 2003 (June 2001) to June 30th, 2006 and is 0.78% (1.47%) annualised.  
 
 
  
 
Overconfidence and Active Management   
 
33 
Those ranks are always in the better half of the overall universe in the sample so it is not 
the case that pension plans delivered better risk-adjusted returns compared to market 
indices in these asset classes.12  
Table 3.1 and 3.2 do not differentiate between active portfolios and indexed portfolios 
so it might be the case that many indexed portfolios slightly underperform the SPI and 
therefore median return is below the index return. Nonetheless this argument is not 
valid because of two different reasons. First, a report by Lusenti (2003) indicates that 
most of the Swiss pension plan assets in various different asset classes are managed 
actively. Out of 110 plans who answered that question 65 plans report to index between 
0% and 10% and further 18 plans index between 10% and 25% of their total assets. On 
the other hand only 14 plans report to index at least 50% of their total assets. Lusenti 
(2003) further indicates that the percentage of indexed assets increases with the size of 
pension plans. As this paper deals with samples of large pension plans it rather underes-
timates the popularity of active management across Swiss pension plans. For a compari-
son Ennis (1997) reports that around 35% of the assets of US pension plans are indexed 
and that the trend is increasing. Lusenti (2003) further reports that there is no significant 
difference between Swiss and international investments with respect to the popularity of 
active management across Swiss pension plans.  
Table 3.3 contains the second reason and shows that active management in equities - but 
not in CHF bonds - is dominant in the sample of pension plans whose decision-makers 
also completed the author’s questionnaire about the better-than-average-effect. As can 
be seen in table 3.3 and graphically in figure 3.1 the majority of all equity portfolios are 
managed actively in each year. A portfolio is defined as actively-managed if its tracking 
error was above 0.3% per annum for Swiss equities and CHF bonds and above 0.5% per 
annum for international equities.13 With this simple criterion one cannot differentiate 
between true indexers and active managers who did not spend their active risk budget. 
But those tracking error levels seem to be a simple and conservative approximation. As 
benchmarks to calculate the relative Alpha and the tracking error we used market indi-
                                                   
12
 The risk free rate is the 12 month money market return according to the Swiss National Bank (SNB) for 
the period from June 30th, 2003 (June 2001) to June 30th, 2006 and is 0.78% (1.47%) annualised. 
13
 For Swiss equities it is easier to replicate the market index (SPI) than for world equities because the 
universe of shares is much smaller. That is why different levels of tracking errors for Swiss and world 
equities are used to define active portfolios. The relatively homogenous universe of CHF bonds in the SBI 
domestic explains the low tracking error limit to define active portfolios. 
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ces. For Swiss equities the Swiss Performance Index (SPI), for World equities the MSCI 
World Index in CHF and for CHF bonds the Swiss Bond Index (SBI). We note that the 
percentage of indexed portfolios has steadily grown between 2001 and 2005 but active 
management in equities is still much more popular. For CHF bonds the picture looks 
different. This can be seen in the last row of table 3.3, which demonstrates that the pen-
sion plans in this sample apply passive management, or at least a type of management 
that resulted in a very low tracking error to the SBI.  
Table 3-3: Popularity and performance of active management 
The table 3.3 contains the number of indexed and active portfolios of all the pension 
plans that participated in the author’s questionnaire for each year from 2000 to 2005. 
Active portfolios are defined as portfolios with a tracking error above 0.3 for Swiss eq-
uities and CHF bonds and with a tracking error above 0.5 for world equities. The suc-
cess rate of the active mandates called “Alpha” in the right columns for every year 
shows how many of all active portfolios performed better than a corresponding market 
index. As benchmarks to calculate the relative Alpha and the tracking error we used 
market indices. For Swiss equities the Swiss Performance Index (SPI), for World equi-
ties the MSCI World Index in CHF and for CHF bonds the Swiss Bond Index (SBI). The 
first row shows the numbers for equities Switzerland and the next two rows contain the 
same information for world equities and CHF bonds. 
 
 
Table 3.3 supports the other results as it shows that most of the actively-managed equity 
portfolios from pension plans that completed the better-than-average-questionnaire have 
not beaten the annual performance of an equity market index in the years 2001 to 2005. 
The columns labeled “Alpha“ contain the number of portfolios with a return above the 
market index in a given year. For equities the success rate, i.e. the number of portfolios 
that have higher annual returns than the market index, varies but is never above 50% 
except. Those results indicate that the Swiss pension plans of the decision-makers who 
completed the better-than-average-questionnaire cannot outperform market indices on 
average and therefore achieve similar performances to the Lusenti and the ASIP sur-
veys.  
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Figure 3-1: Active and indexed portfolios of Swiss pension plans 
Figure 3.1 shows the same results like table 3.3 graphically.  
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We can summarize this section by saying that the implementation of the strategic asset 
allocation with active management is much more popular than indexing across Swiss 
pension plans. But the evidence about the median performance of Swiss pension plans 
with domestic and international equities does not support the dominance of active man-
agement. The median performance across two well established Swiss pension plan sur-
veys is below market indices’ returns and more often than not active portfolios fail to 
beat the performance of a broad market index even gross of fees.  
3.5.2 Better-than-average-effect 
This paper argues that a biased view on the own skill level relative to other investors 
could lead to a heavy reliance on active management. It is now analyzed if decision-
makers of Swiss pension plans are really prone to such a better-than-average-effect.  
To report the susceptibility to the better-than-average-effect we must first have a look at 
the participants’ expectations concerning their current manager’s chances for future 
success, their own manager selection skills and their pension plan’s chances to outper-
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form the other participants in the sample. In one part of the questionnaire the partici-
pants had to tick a corresponding box on a Likert scale between 1 (clearly below aver-
age) to 7 (clearly above average) including 4 (average) to express their opinion. Each 
column in table 3.4 contains the participants’ mean, the t value, the median and the 
standard deviation (rows three to six) for each one of those questions. The sample mean 
is above 4 (average) for all questions and one sample t tests reveal significant differ-
ences between the sample means and the answering option “average” at the 1% level for 
all questions except the outlook to find above average active managers in the future 
which is only significant at the 10% level. This is evidence that the sample is on average 
prone to the better-than-average-effect in the domain of judging their own and their 
managers’ abilities on financial markets.  
Table 3-4: Perceived chances for active management 
Each column lists the summary statistics of the participants’ answers from the ques-
tionnaire. The participants had to tick a box with values from 1 (clearly below average) 
to 7 (clearly above average) to indicate how they perceive the chances of their own pen-
sion plan compared to the other participants' pension plans in the sample. A value of 4 
indicates average. Rows 8 to 14 list the percentage of participants who ticked the differ-
ent answering boxes. Missing values occur either because a participant did not answer 
the question or because a participants' pension plan does not work with internal or ex-
ternal managers. The latter case occurs much more often. 
 
 
Rows eight to fourteen in table 3.4 contain the percentage of chosen answers by the par-
ticipants. The answering options “average” and “slightly above average” are chosen 
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more often than all three options below average and this is again evidence that the deci-
sion-makers in our sample are on average susceptible to the better-than-average-effect. 
More than 93% of the participants believe to have at least average internal and external 
managers and to perform at least on an average level compared to the other pension 
plans in the sample. The first two rows show the sample size and the number of missing 
participants. A participant’s answer is missing either because she refused to answer or 
because he does not apply internal or external management. The latter case applies in 
most cases.  
Correlations between the answers of the decision-makers of Swiss pension plans across 
those four questions provide information about the generality of the better-than-average-
effect across the participants. Spearman rank correlations are applied because the as-
sumption that the participants’ answers are close to normally distributed cannot be 
made. Higher correlations indicate that a participant expresses optimistic views across 
all four questions. The Spearman rank correlations indicate a high level of general 
proneness to the better-than-average-effect because all the correlations are significant at 
the 1% level and range from 0.306 to 0.541. 
In a second step we analyze if the participants in this sample are also prone to the better-
than-average-effect when forecasting returns of different asset classes themselves. The 
six columns in table 3.5 each represent an asset class for which the participants had to 
judge the accuracy of their own return forecast relative to the other participants in the 
survey. The same Likert scale like in table 3.4 was applied. The means for all asset 
classes in table 3.5 are above 4 but one sample t tests provide evidence that the differ-
ences are not significantly different from 4 (row four). This is evidence that the partici-
pants are not significantly prone to the better-than-average-effect in the task of forecast-
ing returns themselves. The only exceptions are equities and the own pension plan re-
turns as the participants judge their own forecasts to be significantly above average. To 
be able to forecast the returns of the own pension plan above average looks reasonable 
as the participants probably have better knowledge about the potential return of the own 
pension plan. Unsurprisingly the option “average” was by far the most chosen one in the 
questionnaire. The option “slightly above average” is more popular than the option 
“rather below average” but the differences are much smaller in the forecasting task than 
in the tasks about a pension plans chances for future success. 
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Table 3-5: Better-than-average-effect in the task of forecasting returns 
Each column lists the summary statistics of the participants’ answers from the ques-
tionnaire. The participants had to tick a box with values from 1 (clearly below average) 
to 7 (clearly above average) to indicate how they judge the accuracy of their own fore-
casts in each asset class compared to the other participants in the sample. A value of 4 
indicates average. Rows 8 to 14 list the percentage of participants who ticked the differ-
ent answering boxes. Missing values occur because a participant did not answer the 
question. 
 
 
This section can be concluded by saying that decision-makers of Swiss pension plans 
are significantly prone to the better-than-average-effect when evaluating the chances of 
future success for their current managers and their own pension plans. But they do not 
believe that they personally can forecast future returns of different asset classes signifi-
cantly better than their colleagues from other Swiss pension plans. 
Besides the participants’ choice of answers on a Likert scale in the questionnaire there is 
another evidence of susceptibility to a better-than-average-effect in the data from the 
forecasting task. It is related to the participants’ formulation of 90% confidence inter-
vals for return forecasts in different asset classes. The participants in the sample forecast 
more attractive risk-return-characteristics for domestic equities at Swiss pension plans 
compared to domestic equities in general as can be seen in figure 3.2.  
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Figure 3-2: Return forecasts for Swiss equities 
In figure 3.2 the distributions of the participants’ subjective 90% confidence intervals 
for Swiss equities return forecasts are shown as boxplot diagramms. The Y-Axis shows 
the return in percentage points for the forecasts for upper and lower boundaries. The 
solid black line in each boxplot indicates the median and the box itself indicates the 
second and third quartile of the distribution. Bullets (stars) reflect outliers that are 
more than 1.5 (3) times above or below the top and bottom end of each box. The dotted 
lines facilitate to see the differences between forecasts for Swiss equities as an asset 
class in general and forecasts for Swiss equities at Swiss pension plans. 
Upper Boundary for
Swiss Equities of Swiss
Pension Plans
Lower Boundary for
Swiss equities of Swiss
Pension Plans
Upper Boundary for
Swiss equities in
general
Lower Boundary for
Swiss equities in
General
50
40
30
20
10
0
-10
-20
-30
-40
R
et
u
rn
 
in
 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
Po
in
ts
160
105
123
135
105
160
134
125
160
137
191
125
137
134
The differences of the upper and lower boundaries are significant at the 5% level in a Wilcoxon signed rank test.
 
 
Figure 3.2 summarizes the participants’ lower and upper boundaries in the return fore-
casting task for the asset class domestic equities in general and in Swiss pension plans 
with four boxplots. The participants expect Swiss pension plans to reduce downside risk 
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of domestic equities but also give up some upside potential because the lower (higher) 
boundaries of their confidence intervals for pension plans’ exposure to domestic equi-
ties are higher (lower) than for domestic equities in general. The fact that the median 
boundaries of the confidence intervals are narrower for the pension plans’ exposure to 
domestic equities than for domestic equities in general indicates that the participants 
expect pension plans to manage this asset class with less volatility than a broad market 
index. Pearson and Tukey (1965) numerically show that dividing a 90% quantile (i.e. 
subtracting the 5% quantile from the 95% quantile) by 3.25 approximates the standard 
deviation of a distribution. Therefore narrower confidence intervals can be related to 
lower expected volatilities. To test the level of significance across boundary differences 
a non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test is applied. It shows that the differences be-
tween the lower and the upper differences are significant at the 5% level. Parametric 
tests would not fit the data because the participants’ forecasts are far away from being 
normaly distributed and outliers might bias the results. Figure 3.3 contains the same 
analysis for the asset class CHF bonds. It shows that the decision-makers of Swiss pen-
sion plans on aggregate expect to match the downside risk of CHF bonds in general as 
there are no significant differences between the participants’ lower boundaries. How-
ever the participants expect to have a higher upside potential in CHF bonds as the upper 
boundaries are significantly higher for CHF bonds in Swiss pension plans than in gen-
eral. Figure 3.4 shows the lower and upper boundaries for the forecasted returns of the 
participants’ own pension plans versus an average Swiss pension plan. The participants 
forecast a higher upside potential for the own pension plan and a lower downside risk 
and both effects are significant according to Wilcoxon signed rank test. Those results 
are in line with the participant’s propensity to the better-than-average-effect about the 
future success of their managers and their pension plans.  
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Figure 3-3: Return forecasts for CHF bonds 
In figure 3.3 the distributions of the participants’ subjective 90% confidence intervals 
for CHF bonds return forecasts are shown as boxplot diagramms. The Y-Axis shows the 
return in percentage points for the forecasts for upper and lower boundaries. The solid 
black line in each boxplot indicates the median and the box itself indicates the second 
and third quartile of the distribution. Bullets (stars) reflect outliers that are more than 
1.5 (3) times above or below the top and bottom end of each box. The dotted lines facili-
tate to see the differences between forecasts for CHF bonds as an asset class in general 
and forecasts for CHF bonds at Swiss pension plans. 
Upper Boundary for
CHF Bonds of Swiss
Pension Plans
Lower Boundary for
CHF Bonds of Swiss
Pension Plans
Upper Boundary for
CHF Bonds in
General
Lower Boundary for
CHF Bonds in
General
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
R
et
u
rn
 
in
 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
Po
in
ts
191
109
156
117
125
The differences of the lower boundaries are significant at the 5% level in a Wilcoxon signed rank test.
 
  
 
Overconfidence and Active Management   
 
42 
Figure 3-4: Return forecasts for Swiss pension plans 
In figure 3.4 the distributions of the participants’ subjective 90% confidence intervals 
for return forecasts for Swiss pension plans are shown as boxplot diagramms. The Y-
Axis shows the return in percentage points for the forecasts for upper and lower 
boundaries. The solid black line in each boxplot indicates the median and the box itself 
indicates the second and third quartile of the distribution. Bullets (stars) reflect outliers 
that are more than 1.5 (3) times above or below the top and bottom end of each box. 
The dotted lines facilitate to see the differences between forecasts for an average Swiss 
pension plan and forecasts for the own pension plan. 
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3.6 Discussion and conclusion 
Some Swiss pension plans delivered extraordinary good performances in equities over 
the last couple of years but a majority of the Swiss pension plans that participate volun-
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tarily in well established performance surveys delivered equity performances below 
market indices on an absolute as well as on a risk-adjusted basis even gross of fees. This 
does not imply that active management cannot add value for Swiss pension plans’s eq-
uity portfolios but it shows how difficult the selection and the maintenance of successful 
active managers are. Many asset managers point out that past performance is no indica-
tion for future performance so it cannot be ruled out that the managers in this sample 
will outperform broad market indices in the future. But in order to meet expectations 
future results must be much better than historical results.  
To put this evidence into perspective we have to bear in mind that we cannot directly 
link a participant’s answers in the questionnaire to the investments of his/her pension 
plan as we do not know how big the influence of one decision-maker on the whole pen-
sion plan investment is. In other words, just because one decision-maker expresses bi-
ased expectations does not imply that his pension plan will fail with active management. 
Nevertheless it is puzzling that most of the decision-makers in the sample are highly 
convinced about the abilities of their current managers, their own manager selection 
skills and the chances for future success of their pension plan despite the observable 
track record. It’s even more puzzling when you consider that a comparison with the 
average is very easy on financial markets as market indices are freely available and of-
ten discussed in the media. So where is this gap between biased expectations and real-
ized performances in equities coming from? As this paper suggest, the better-than-
average-effect is one explanation. A few arguments are now discussed in the context of 
Swiss pension plans. 
At first glance one might argue that the pension plans in this sample might not be aware 
of their disappointing relative performance versus broad market indices. However this 
argument is weak because the pension plans in this sample are widely regarded as lead-
ing pension plans in Switzerland and they participate voluntarily in popular surveys of 
Swiss pension plans. They receive the results of the Lusenti and the ASIP surveys 
automatically as they are participants of those studies so it seems unlikely that they 
never look that the results of those surveys. So the assumption that the decision-makers 
of Swiss pension plans are aware of poor relative median performance of Swiss pension 
plans versus market indices seems safe. Of course, for all pension plans who have not 
yet implemented a proper measurement of their performances in different asset classes 
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relative to appropriate market indices the recommendation clearly is to start sooner 
rather than later.  
Another very simple explanation could be that if the decision-makers of Swiss pension 
plans kept on believing to have above average managers and above average selections 
skills they might still be convinced to outperform in the long run despite the disappoint-
ing results so far. Indeed it takes a lot of time and data to be able to correctly differenti-
ate between a managers’ level of skill and pure luck as Waring and Siegel (2003) ex-
plain. If that was the case the participants in our sample will not put a lot of weight on 
their recent performance but more on their perception about their chances of future per-
formance. Further research needs to be done in order to understand how much an indi-
vidual weighs knowledge from the past versus hope for the future.  
Less simplistic arguments can be found in the domain of the decision-makers’ incen-
tives to express a highly confident view about current managers in the own pension plan 
and about the own managers selection skills. Camerer and Lovallo (1999) offer the so 
called reference-group-neglect as an explanation for why people could seem to be prone 
to the better-than-average-effect. If the participants in a sample do not pay attention to 
the definition of the peer group – in this paper the Swiss pension plans that report to the 
ASIP survey as was clearly stated – they might compare themselves with an inappropri-
ate peer group – in our case maybe with all pension plans in Switzerland. Because of the 
self-selecting nature of the ASIP survey and the required use of a global custodian for 
the data provision it is possible that the average performance of the pension plans in the 
ASIP survey is above the unobservable average of all pension plans in Switzerland. So 
the benchmark to beat in our sample might be higher than a benchmark that consists of 
all Swiss pension plans and the reference-group-neglect offers an explanation for the 
high proportion of participants that demonstrate the better-than-average-effect.  
Furthermore it might be the case that some decision-makers in our sample are more 
concerned with being above average in the Swiss pension plan universe than with the 
relative performance versus a market index (this is the case for UK pension plans ac-
cording to a study by Blake, Lehman and Timmermann (2002)). However this argument 
is no excuse for the poor relative performance versus market indices because the goal of 
active management in traditional asset classes like equities and bonds is usually to out-
perform market indices and not pension plan peer groups.  
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Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) present other incentives for pension plan man-
agers to apply active management despite a lack of success in the past. One reason 
could be job security. Active management requires the decision-makers to select active 
managers. This is arguably a more complex and interesting process when compared to 
the selection of indexers, which tends to prioritize the factor price. This study suggests 
that some decision-makers may fear that their ability to add value is diluted when too 
high a proportion of their plan’s assets are indexed. Decision-makers have strong incen-
tives to demonstrate confidence about their active managers and their own manager se-
lection skills going forward, and to ignore disappointing performance relative to market 
indices in the past to defend their employment. 
Another reason could be that the performance of an active manager might not be the 
whole story behind an appointment to run portfolios for a pension plan. Lakonishok, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) call such a phenomenon “schmoozing”. It describes the col-
orful manner that asset managers sometimes explain their stock decisions, hold hands 
with their clients and explain their absolute and relative performance ex post. With suc-
cessful “schmoozing”, active managers might be able to convince decision-makers at 
Swiss pension plans about their skills in spite of an unsuccessful track record. As out-
lined before, investment committees of Swiss pension plans do not only consist of in-
vestment professionals but also of delegates of the board of trustees who might be less 
familiar with daily portfolio management. And it seems plausible that an active manager 
with excellent schmoozing abilities is in a good position to be retained by a pension 
plan despite a relative underperformance versus market indices.  
In line with this thinking another incentive for Swiss pension plans not to replace un-
successful active managers can be seen in the linkage of other corporate services some 
captive active managers provide. Large asset managers typically affiliated to banking 
groups not only offer the sponsor of a pension plan active management services for the 
pension plan’s assets but also services in the field of credit management, refinancing, 
mortgages, financial consulting, currency management and many other services to the 
sponsoring businesses. The decision-makers at the sponsor organization have incentives 
to retain active managers for the pension fund which also provide such other valuable 
services to the company. Especially in a defined contribution scheme where the risk of 
the retirement payments are borne by the employees a company can pay for many ser-
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vices via management fees for pension plan assets and take those costs off the current 
account statements of the company. To express a strong belief in the future success of 
active managers might be a convenient way to hide the true motivation for keeping ac-
tive managers with a disappointing relative performance. Further research is needed to 
analyze the incentives on a personal level and the effects of the regulatory framework 
with respect to the separation of the pension plan and the sponsor group.  
In the case a pension plan employs in-house active managers the problem has also a 
personal aspect. It is likely to be much easier to hire and fire external active asset man-
agers than in-house managers because the personal relationship with external people is 
usually less strong than with in-house employees. This might be a reason why the par-
ticipants in our sample indicate that they are confident about the skill of their current 
internal active managers relative to the other pension plans’ managers. Probably those 
answers reflect the view that there are no opportunities for a replacement and the current 
setup is still perceived as attractive despite the poor track record. Pretending to feel con-
fident with a mediocre in-house active manager could probably be more convenient for 
an investment committee member than firing this colleague. Such qualitative arguments 
appear plausible at first glance but require more research to analyze the interdependent 
relationships in more depth and to prove or reject these hypotheses.   
A completely different type of incentive for active management despite a bad track re-
cord is offered by Odean and Barber (2001). It might be the case that active manage-
ment is perceived as more entertaining than indexing by the decision-makers of Swiss 
pension plans. As a proxy to measure the degree of entertainment it is also analysed 
whether there are any differences in the answering patterns between those participants 
who have a private asset management account and those who do not. An independent t 
test shows that the management of an own account has neither a significant influence on 
their proneness to the better-than-average-effect nor on the formulation of return fore-
casts. This is evidence that the degree being entertained by actively managing money is 
not related to each other in this sample. 
After the discussion of potential arguments that explain the occurrence of a better-than-
average-effect in the sample we finally turn to a recommendation about how to deal 
with it. The issue is theoretically addressed in a model by Thorley (1999). He compares 
the competition to generate an outperformance on financial markets to a basketball 
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freethrow shooting contest. Every participant can choose between throwing freethrows 
himself or not throwing and just getting the average score. The throwing corresponds to 
active management and the latter to indexing. It only makes sense to shoot the 
freethrows if a participant believes to be an above average freethrow shooter compared 
to all the other contestants in the game. If only children are playing on the court shoot-
ing freethrows as an adult might be a good opportunity to beat the average score. By 
contrast when on the court with the basketball dream team from the USA not shooting 
oneself but taking the average score is probably a more successful strategy. So the deci-
sion about implementing the strategic asset allocation with active managers should de-
pend on how the overall level of competition and the own abilities compared to the 
competitors are perceived. The better-than-average-effect might bias the perception of 
personal abilities and skills relative to the other competitors. The historical performance 
of Swiss pension plans supports the view that not every Swiss pension plan is aware of 
its strengths and weaknesses relative to the other competitors on financial markets. So 
the model recommends to analyze in which asset classes the pension plan should have a 
true advantage versus most of the participants in an asset class and only apply active 
management in those asset classes. 
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3.8 Appendix I 
The questionnaires provided in this section are translated from the German original 
questionnaires. 
The questions about the own ability to forecast returns in the year 2006 for different 
asset classes relative to the other decision-makers of Swiss pension plans in this sample 
have been worded the following way:  
“Please evaluate the accuracy of your personal forecast relative to the forecasts of the 
other decision-makers of Swiss pension plans in this sample. Please tick the corre-
sponding box.”  
 
Clearly 
below 
Average 
Below 
Average 
Rather 
below 
Average 
Average Rather 
above 
Average 
Above 
Average 
Clearly 
above 
Average 
O O O O O O O 
 
For the questions about the future chances of internal and external managers as well as 
the own pension plan the same Likert scale form 1 to 7 has been used. The questions 
have been worded the following way: 
“How do you evaluate your pension plan’s chances to find (internal or external) active 
managers who will perform above average in the future?” 
“How do you evaluate your pension plan’s chances to outperform the average perform-
ance of the other Swiss pension plans who participated in this survey on a risk-adjusted 
basis?” 
“How do you evaluate your internal (external) managers’ chances to outperform the 
internal (external) managers of the other Swiss pension plans who participated in this 
survey?” 
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4. The Performance of Groups and Individuals 
in Financial Decision-Making 
Abstract 
On financial markets many investment decisions are taken by groups and not by indi-
viduals. The evidence, however, whether groups perform better than individuals, is am-
biguous. We analyze the portfolios of groups and individuals in an asset allocation task 
on an experimental market. We find that groups on average outperform individuals, i.e. 
achieve higher Sharpe Ratios but the difference is not significant. Furthermore, stochas-
tic groups built of randomly chosen individuals perform slightly better than the real 
groups on average. But an analysis of our group sample average loses sight of the large 
performance discrepancies across groups. An important determinant of the success of 
the groups in our experiment is the degree of information exchange between group 
members as a higher level is linked to a significantly better performance.  
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4.1 Introduction 
Today many decisions in the domain of financial markets are taken by groups and not 
by individuals. For example asset management firms often appoint management teams 
instead of single managers and institutional investors like pension plans elect boards of 
trustees to define the strategic asset allocation and investment committees to decide 
about tactical allocations. However, economic research so far has not put a lot of atten-
tion on differences between the outcome of individual and group decisions. According 
to Kocher and Sutter (2005) one reason might be that many economic models assume 
the decision-maker to choose equilibrium (or optimal) actions. In such cases it does not 
matter whether the decision-maker is an individual or a group. But the question is 
whether it matters in practice when real people take decisions. 
The main research contribution of this paper is to analyze the performance of a sample 
of groups and a sample of individuals in an asset allocation task. On an experimental 
market a sample of individuals and a sample of groups were asked to build portfolios of 
3 risky assets and 1 riskfree asset. Subjects were paid according to the Sharpe Ratio 
they achieved during the experiment. We analyze whether groups take economically 
more efficient decisions than individuals and find that on average groups do not signifi-
cantly but only marginally outperform individuals. 
A focus solely on the average performance of groups, however, disregards the heteroge-
neity in our sample. There are large performance discrepancies between the best and the 
worst groups and they seem to be related to different processes groups apply to agree on 
an asset allocation in our experiment. Recordings of the discussions within each group 
during the experiment allow us to judge how much information the group members ex-
changed and how they chose their asset allocation. In line with the hidden profile thesis 
of Stasser and Titus (1985) the success of a group in the experiment is positively related 
to the level of information exchange across group members. So groups do not generally 
take economically more efficient decisions than individuals but have the potential to do 
so if the group members exchange their personal information and their ideas.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of related 
research about group decision making and section III describes the hypotheses that are 
tested. Section IV outlines the design of the experiment and describes the data. Section 
  
 
The Performance of Groups and Individuals in Financial Decision-Making   
 
54 
V contains the results of our experiment and section VI discusses our findings and con-
cludes.  
4.2 Related research 
The existing literature provides no generalized theoretical framework about the differ-
ences of judgments between groups and individuals in economic decision-making and 
the evidence from empirical studies is mixed. However, research in psychology and 
economics offers various insights into the decision-making processes of groups and 
their performance relative to individuals. This section first discusses an important dis-
tinction between different types of experimental tasks namely judgmental and intellec-
tive tasks. Then it lists results from previous studies about economic decision-making of 
groups versus individuals in psychology and in economics to provide an overview of the 
heterogeneity of the results. Finally the focus is on two psychological aspects which 
address possible outcomes of group decisions relative to individual decisions in general.  
The psychological literature distinguishes between judgmental tasks and intellective 
tasks as outlined by Davis (1992). The former are characterized by not having an undis-
putable optimal solution whereas the latter typically have a self-confirming and easily 
demonstrable optimal solution. For example tasks in which subjective risk preferences 
are measured can be categorized as judgmental. In contrast logic problems like the 
Tower of Hanoi are intellective problems as Cooper and Kagel (2005) explain. The as-
set allocation task in our experiment is an intellective one. First, because it has an opti-
mal solution - the tangency portfolio which theoretically could be calculated by each 
participant who is familiar with portfolio optimization – and second because the partici-
pants receive feedback about their performance during each round of the experiment so 
there is the potential to find evidence about the success of a certain strategy. But we 
acknowledge that given the information we have provided in the experiment the calcula-
tion of the tangency portfolio is extremely demanding without a computer and very dif-
ficult to demonstrate ex ante. 
Representative for the wide variety of results of judgmental tasks in psychology Kerr, 
Kramer and MacCoun (1996) provide a survey of empirical studies about decision-
making of groups versus individuals. They point out that many differences with respect 
to the methodology, the group framing and the task processing make a meta-study al-
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most impossible. The authors further note that the group decision-making process (for 
example majority voting, equilibrating or unanimous voting) is highly influential on the 
outcome as it can attenuate, amplify or reproduce the judgment biases of individuals. 
The evidence in psychological research on intellective tasks is less multisided. Before 
1955 it seemed clear to both research and common sense that groups outperform indi-
viduals in intellective tasks (see Shaw (1932) for a classic experiment). But then Lorge 
and Solomon (1955) re-examined Shaw’s classic study and introduced a new standard 
called “truth-wins-standard” to measure the superiority of group versus individuals. It 
states that groups will find a correct solution to an intellective task if at least one group 
member proposes it. The larger the size of the group is the larger are the probabilities 
for synergies and the chances to solve the problem. The re-examination of Shaw’s and 
other data revealed that groups rarely outperform individuals, sometimes match and 
usually fall below the truth-wins-standard as Davis (1992) summarizes. So a meaningful 
judgment of the performance of groups requires not only a comparison with a sample of 
individuals but also a measurement relative to a truth-wins-standard. 
The debate about the performance of groups relative to individuals continues as more 
recent evidence from psychological studies of intellective tasks is available. As far as 
rationality in the decision-making process is concerned Yaniv and Bornstein (1998) 
show that groups tend to take more rational decisions than individuals because the 
groups in their sample tendered lower offers and accepted lower bids in a one-shot ulti-
matum game. According to a study by Laughlin, Bonner and Altermatt (1998) about 
formulating hypotheses in an intellective task with playing cards, groups of four partici-
pants perform at the level of the best individual and therefore significantly above indi-
viduals’ average. They argue that the group performance increases with task complexity 
and information variety as groups can better handle such issues. Rockenbach, Sadrieh 
and Mathauschek (2006) report that groups achieve similar levels of expected payoffs 
with significantly lower risk than individuals when choosing between different lotteries. 
Bornstein, Kugler and Ziegelmeyer (2004) report that groups exit a centipede game sig-
nificantly earlier than individuals which is more rational from a game theory perspec-
tive. Concluding, the authors point out that groups and individuals make different deci-
sions in strategic games and that in a majority of the cases group decisions are closer to 
the “rational” solution. Counter evidence is offered by Cason and Mui (1997) who 
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found that groups make more generous allocations in a dictator game than individuals 
and were thus further away from the game-theoretic prediction. Kocher and Sutter 
(2005) report that groups learn faster than individuals in a beauty-contest game on an 
experimental market but they point out that groups are neither smarter nor better deci-
sion-makers than individuals per se. 
As in psychology the bulk of economic evidence about decision-making in intellective 
tasks so far indicates a tendency for groups to take more rational decisions than indi-
viduals. Cooper and Kagel (2005) report that groups of two persons tend to take more 
strategic decisions than individuals in a signaling game even if the truth-wins-standard 
is taken into account. Blinder and Morgan (2005) report that groups tend to take better 
decisions than individuals in a monetary policy game. But they find no significant dif-
ferences between majority decisions and unanimous decisions as far as groups’ per-
formances are concerned. Lombardelli, Proudman and Talbot (2005) report in a similar 
study that groups achieve significantly better results than individuals in a policy making 
game on an experimental market and that groups even outperform the best individuals. 
They argue that the worst individual decisions are averaged out in the group and that the 
members of the groups learn from each other. But they also note in their sample that the 
opportunity to discuss in one part of the sample did not enhance the performance rela-
tive to the other part of the sample in which groups were not allowed to discuss.  
The results of empirical studies on real financial markets are in line with those from 
experimental markets as no stable differences between the performance of groups and 
individuals have been found so far. Barber and Odean (2000) report from a sample of 
166 US investment clubs out of 78’000 trading accounts that the clubs lag the perform-
ance of the S&P 500 Index by 3.7% and the performance of individual investors in this 
sample by 2.3% after costs. However, they note that clubs’ portfolios show on average 
lower monthly volatilities than individuals’ portfolios - due to a higher degree of portfo-
lio diversification - and therefore achieve a higher Sharpe Ratio. Baer, Kempf and Ru-
enzi (2005) find in their sample of mutual funds that funds managed by teams show 
lower levels of unsystematic risk. Such funds also change their risk to a lesser extent as 
a response to prior performance than funds managed by individuals. However, there is 
no significant difference between the performances of team managed funds and indi-
vidually managed funds overall. 
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After this overview about the heterogeneity of decision-making of groups relative to 
individuals we now turn to two psychological aspects about how the decision-making 
process in a group might impact the outcome. Those aspects serve as explanations for 
the heterogeneity of the results in our own group sample and also help to interpret the 
evidence of our asset allocation experiment. The first aspect addresses the level of in-
formation exchange across group members as one requirement of successful group deci-
sions. The second focuses on the outcome of a group decision when individual positions 
and views are exchanged across group members. 
Stasser and Titus (1985) offer one explanation for why group decisions might not be 
fully rational. They report that groups tend not to use all potentially available informa-
tion in their decision making process in a political voting game but rather focus on in-
formation that is both shared by everybody in the group and in line with the general 
thinking of the group. In the authors’ experiment every group member received differ-
ent but slightly overlapping information about candidates in the voting game. To find 
the best candidate the group members had to share all their available information but 
few groups did so and because of this lack of information exchange opted for the wrong 
candidate. This effect is referred to as “hidden profiles” and can lead to bad decisions 
despite the fact that the group as a whole had all necessary information to take a rational 
decision. So the recommendation for groups is to share all available information. Janis 
(1982) offers supportive evidence. Based on studies about American foreign policy de-
cisions since 1940 he concludes that a process for successful group decisions is charac-
terized, among other things, by the rational weighting of possible options in the light of 
all available evidence. Those results imply that there might be differences with respect 
to the performance of groups in our asset allocation experiment because of different 
levels of information exchange across group members.  
When analyzing the impact of information exchange across group members with respect 
to performance, we need to assess how the information is processed in a group. The 
evidence as to whether groups moderate or increase individual positions in the decision-
making process is ambiguous. Until the Sixties it was widely believed that group deci-
sions are more or less an average reflection of individual beliefs. Today this view is 
supported by the theoretical work of Sah and Stiglitz (1986) who argue that group deci-
sions are less extreme and less volatile than individual decisions or by Moscovici (1985) 
  
 
The Performance of Groups and Individuals in Financial Decision-Making   
 
58 
who presents empirical evidence that group decisions may shift individual attitudes to-
wards more moderate positions. In contrast Stoner (1961) counters those predictions by 
describing the so called “risky shift” effect. It refers to the observation that groups do 
not moderate extreme positions of individuals after a discussion of the issue in a group 
but rather emphasize those extreme positions even more. Moscovici and Zavalloni 
(1969) generalized this line of thinking and introduced the “group polarization” effect. 
They argue that group polarization does not necessarily lead to risky shifts but can also 
lead to “cautios shifts”. So following an information exchange between group members, 
a group's decision will be a more extreme version of individual's preferred action but it 
is not possible to say ex ante whether it will be riskier or more cautious. 
4.3 Hypotheses 
We now turn to the hypotheses that will be tested in this paper. In general our null hy-
potheses postulate that there are no differences between groups and individuals with 
respect to portfolio construction in our asset allocation experiment. The reason is, as 
outlined in the section above, that the evidence about the decision-making quality of 
groups in judgmental and in intellective tasks relative to individuals is mixed. We not 
only compare the performance of individuals and groups in our experiment but also 
judge the quality of those allocation decisions by the groups in our sample. Therefore, 
we apply 3 different types of hypotheses (1.1, 1.2 and 1.3) that address the perform-
ances in our experiment. In addition we formulate hypotheses 2 and 3 to analyze the 
level of risk our participants are willing to take. Last but not least hypothesis 4 is fo-
cused on differences regarding the level of information exchange within the sample of 
groups.  
Hypothesis 1.1: On average the asset allocations of groups are as efficient as the asset 
allocations of individuals. 
Hypothesis 1.2: On average the asset allocations of groups are as efficient as asset allo-
cations which are calculated by averaging out the asset allocations of 3 randomly cho-
sen individuals. 
Hypothesis 1.3: On average the asset allocations of groups are less efficient than asset 
allocations which represent the best single asset allocation out of 3 randomly chosen 
individuals. 
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Hypothesis 2: On average the portfolios of groups are as volatile as the portfolios of 
individuals.  
Hypothesis 3: On average groups shift the weightings of each asset in their asset alloca-
tions as much as individuals from one round to the next. 
Hypothesis 4: Groups with a higher level of information exchange between group mem-
bers outperform groups with a lower level. 
We will rely on Mann-Whitney tests to test the significance of our hypotheses. Mann-
Whitney tests are nonparametric which is important for the analysis because the distri-
butions of the Sharpe Ratios and the asset weightings of individuals and groups are very 
different from a normal distribution. The experimental design to address our hypotheses 
is explained in the next section. 
4.4 Experiment 
4.4.1 Experimental design 
Our experiment consists of an asset allocation task with 3 risky assets and 1 riskfree 
asset. To test our hypotheses about the groups’ and individuals’ asset allocation effi-
ciency we need a framework to measure the efficiency and the degree of risk. Accord-
ing to the arguments from Bossaerts and Plott (2002) a CAPM framework makes sense 
to set up such an experimental market and to compare the participants’ Sharpe Ratios. 
They argue that the empirical difficulties to test the CAPM do not rule out its usefulness 
in an experimental market because the many divergences from reality can be controlled. 
The Sharpe Ratio of a portfolio is a well established measure to compare the efficiency 
of different portfolios and so we can rank the participants’ portfolios according to their 
Sharpe Ratios and compare groups’ and individuals’ achievements. One advantage of 
applying the Sharpe Ratio as a measure for portfolio efficiency compared to the return is 
that the Sharpe Ratio is not subject to the participants’ degree of risk aversion. So the 
target function in the experiment is the same for all participants regardless of their risk 
preferences and this allows an unbiased comparison of the performances. To test hy-
pothesis 2 we use only the denominator of the Sharpe Ratio which is the volatility of a 
portfolio. To examine hypothesis 3 we analyze the weightings of each asset in each 
round of the asset allocations. 
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Instead of informing the participants directly about the expected returns and the volatil-
ities of the assets we have defined 4 different but equally probable states of nature 
(Bossaerts and Plott (2002)) with distinct returns for all of our assets. Table 4.1a con-
tains a summary of the states of nature and the returns of each asset in those states. A 
detailed provision of information about the asset’s volatilities and correlations would 
have allowed the participants with an economic background to easily calculate the op-
timal asset allocation. However, to make our experiment as realistic as possible, we did 
not provide such information because, in reality, the correct covariance matrix is also 
unknown on an ex ante basis. 
To keep our asset allocation experiment in line with the characteristics of real financial 
assets we have defined risk premia for the assets that increase with the volatility of the 
returns. Also the returns have been defined to have low correlations between the assets 
in the different states of nature. The goal in our experiment is to maximize this Sharpe 
Ratio, which is similar to finding the tangency portfolio. To make this search challeng-
ing we have defined very different weights for each risky asset as the tangency portfolio 
weights in table 4.1b show. This assures that it is hard to find the optimal portfolio by 
accident and that the odds are small that averaging out individual allocations across 
group members lead automatically to the optimal solution. Also the optimal solution is 
far away from either an allocation of 100% in one asset or an equally weighted alloca-
tion.14 Table 4.1b also contains the excess returns of the risky assets and the covariance 
matrix that is needed to solve our asset allocation problem to find the maximum Sharpe 
Ratio. The participants in our experiment did not receive any information from table 
4.1b. 
                                                   
14
 An alternative approach would have been to draw random states of nature. However, in our pilot ex-
periment we realized that the effect of random states increases the difficulty of the asset allocation task 
considerably because the feedback is blurred due to its randomness. As a consequence it seemed as if the 
participants were not able to learn from previous rounds. We acknowledge that in our framework the 
participants do not get a fuzzy feedback about the efficiency of their allocation which would be the case 
in real world markets. However the lack of randomness does not affect our research goal which is to ana-
lyze performance differences between individuals and groups and we did not want to threaten this study 
by relying on random results. 
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Table 4-1: Parameters of the experiment 
The table 4.1a lists the different assets (A, B, C and D) in the experiment and their re-
turns in the 4 different states of nature in the experiment. Every participant only re-
ceived table 4.1a. Table 4.1b contains the excess returns of each asset above the risk-
free rate, the covariance matrix resulting from the state-returns in table 4.1a and the 
weights of each asset in the tangency portfolio as well as the resulting maximum Sharpe 
Ratio achievable in every round. Only the relative weightings of the risky assets A, B 
and C are relevant for the calculation of the maximum Sharpe Ratio. For example and 
allocation of 3% in A, 33.5% in B, 13.5% in C and 50% in D respectively would have 
also returned the maximum Sharpe Ratio. 
 
 
15 rounds, preceded by a test run, were played in the experiment to give the participants 
a chance to learn from results of previous rounds. In each of those 15 rounds the partici-
pants had to choose an asset allocation. After every round each individual and each 
group was informed about the mean return, the volatility and the Sharpe Ratio of their 
portfolio in that round as well as for the overall experiment. In addition every partici-
pant received information about the highest Sharpe Ratio a participant achieved in each 
round of the experiment. This feedback allowed the participants to better judge their 
own allocation. Such information also fits reality because the performance of (success-
ful) competitors on financial markets is usually observable.  
Hidden profiles were dampened in our experimental design to a certain extent because 
we provided everybody with the same set of information as every participant received 
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the same instructions (see appendix I for a translation of the original German instruc-
tions). Given this set of information every participant was in a position to find the opti-
mal solution herself and this substantially reduces the issues with hidden profiles. De-
fining characteristics of a hidden profile according to Schulz-Hardt and Greitmeyer 
(2003) do not exist in our experimental design. However, the groups still face a special 
sort of a hidden profile effect. If the group members do not share their personal opinions 
and ideas about how to weight the different assets they might agree on a bad allocation 
simply because no group member could solve the problem but allows his personal view 
to prevail. The impact of the level of information exchange on performance is what we 
want to test in hypothesis 4 and so the discussions of each group have been recorded to 
collect data about the level of information exchange within our groups. The recording 
started with the distribution of the instructions of the experiment and it ended with the 
announcement of the results in the last round of the experiment.15 
To set appropriate incentives the participants were paid according to their average 
Sharpe Ratio across all rounds of the experiment. The average payout per participant 
was 38.5 CHF. Also a bonus for the winning group in each group experiment and for 
the best four individuals in each individual experiment was paid. All participants were 
informed about the payoff structure via the instructions. 
4.4.2 Data  
The computerized experiments were conducted between June 15th, 2007 and July 11th, 
2007 at the University of Zurich.16 In total 93 students participated in our experiment, 
43 female and 50 male, with ages ranging from 19 to 32. 16 study economics at the 
University of Zurich, 27 were other students from the University of Zurich and 50 were 
students from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETHZ). The participants have 
been recruited using the recruitment system ORSEE (see Greiner (2004)). 45 students 
participated in the experiment as individuals and 48 as part of a group of 3 people. In 
order to rule out any biases in the groups we constructed the groups randomly and nei-
ther gender nor education or any other personal characteristics were taken into account 
                                                   
15
 The recordings (in Swiss German) are available from the authors on request. 
16
 The experiment was programmed and conducted with the experimental software “z-tree” (see 
Fischbacher, Urs, 1999, z-tree. Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments, IEW Working Paper, 
University of Zurich.). 
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when forming the groups. All participants drew cards with different letters and the per-
sons with the same letters formed a group. 
The experiments for the individuals were conducted in the laboratory of the Institute for 
Empirical Research in Economics and the group experiments in the Swiss Banking In-
stitute at the University of Zurich. Two experiments with 24 and 21 participants were 
conducted to collect data about the individuals and four experiments with 5 (4 on one 
occasion) groups were conducted to collect the group data. There are no significant dif-
ferences between individual participants and group members with respect to personal 
factors like education, age, gender and personal interest in financial topics. Therefore, 
differences between the performance of individuals and groups in the experiments can-
not be attributed to personal characteristics of the participants.  
To make sure that every participant fully understood the tasks in the experiment ques-
tionnaire I was distributed and the experiment did not start until each participant in each 
experiment successfully completed questionnaire I. The completion of questionnaire I 
took roughly 20 minutes in each experiment. To gather more information about the par-
ticipants’ experience as a group member or as an individual questionnaire II was dis-
tributed after the last round of the experiment. Appendix II contains a translation of both 
questionnaires from the German original.  
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Performance comparison between individuals and groups 
To judge the portfolio efficiency of individuals and groups (hypothesis 1.1) we compare 
the Sharpe Ratios and check if there is a significant difference in each round and across 
the whole experiment.17 To calculate the Sharpe Ratio of each participant’s portfolio in 
each round we relied on the theoretical distribution according to the states and returns 
defined in table 4.1a.  
                                                   
17
 3 groups have been excluded from the analysis because some group members already completed the 
experiment as individuals. Their experience as individuals positively biased the overall results of those 
groups because they already knew the optimal allocation. As we reported the best Sharpe Ratio of an 
experiment to all participants it might be the case that having biased groups also biased the whole ex-
periment. A Mann-Whitney test confirmed, however, that there is no significant difference at the 10% 
level in every but one round between group experiment sessions with and without exclusions. So the 
exclusion to those groups does not affect the results of all the other groups in any way.  
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Figure 4-1: Sharpe Ratios in the experiment 
Figure 4.1a shows the average Sharpe Ratio per round for individuals, groups and both 
types of stochastic groups; average stochastic groups and best-in-group stochastic 
groups.  
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Figure 4.1b shows the median Sharpe Ratio per round for individuals, groups and both 
types of stochastic groups; average stochastic groups and best-in-group stochastic 
groups. 
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Figure 4.1a shows the average and figure 4.1b the median Sharpe Ratio for individuals 
and groups per round in our asset allocation experiment. The maximum Sharpe Ratio to 
be achieved in each round of our experiment is 0.923 (table 4.1b). It can be seen that 
groups achieve better Sharpe Ratios on average (and in the median) than individuals in 
13 (15) rounds.18 A Mann-Whitney test, however, reveals that groups do not signifi-
cantly outperform individuals, as the difference between the achieved Sharpe Ratio of 
groups and individuals is not significant at the 5% level in any round. The Z scores of 
Mann-Whitney tests across all 15 rounds of the experiment range from -1.46 to -0.16 
and the average is only -0.86 so we cannot reject hypothesis 1.1. 
Furthermore, figures 4.1a and 4.1b reveal that both groups and individuals learn on av-
erage because the average and median Sharpe Ratios are more often increasing than 
decreasing over the 15 rounds in the experiment. There is no indication that one sample 
learnt faster than the other because the evolving trends of groups and individuals during 
the 15 rounds in the experiment were very similar. For individuals (groups) we ob-
served 10 (9) increases on average and 11 (9) in the median. Unsurprisingly the learning 
effect was larger in the first half of the experiment than in the second half, and there is 
no single group and only one individual who performed better in the first round than in 
the last round.  
An equal weighting of the risky assets in our experiments yields a Sharpe Ratio of 
0.724. In figure 4.1a we see that groups on average achieved higher Sharpe Ratios al-
ready in the first round whereas individuals slightly underperformed an equally 
weighted allocation. But from the second round on both samples perform on average 
significantly better with their allocation according to a one sample t test. So, on average, 
individuals as well as the groups figured out very quickly how to beat the Sharpe Ratio 
of an equally weighted asset allocation in our experiment. 
                                                   
18
 The results in this paper are based on different experimental sessions which might not allow for an 
aggregation of results from different sessions. What could have biased the results is that the Sharpe Ratio 
of the best participant was shown to all other participants in each round of an experiment. Theoretically 
the odds of having a lucky participant who starts with a very good allocation is significantly higher in 
experiments with 24 individuals than it is with only 5 groups so the feedbacks participants receive might 
differ. But there is one argument which invalidates this issue. We observed that in each group experiment 
at least one group was achieving very high Sharpe Ratios during each round of the experiment so the 
feedbacks were almost identical for all participants in every experimental session. Mann-Whitney test 
show that there are no significant differences between the best individuals and groups of each session. 
Furthermore, the number of observations in a single group session (5 groups) is too small to make any 
analysis so an aggregation is necessary to draw meaningful conclusions.  
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4.5.2 Performance comparison with stochastic groups 
In this section we address hypotheses 1.2 and 1.3 which compare the quality of group 
decision-making relative to stochastic groups.19 To judge the performance of groups in 
more depth we constructed two types of stochastic group samples mimicking potential 
group decision-making rules and we compared the Sharpe Ratios of those two stochas-
tic group samples with our individual and group samples. One stochastic group sample 
served as a proxy for averaging the asset allocation decision of three individuals and 
was named “average stochastic group”. An observation of the average stochastic group 
sample can be interpreted as a group decision in which the members of the group agreed 
to an even-handed compromise. To construct one observation in this sample we ran-
domly selected the asset allocation of three individuals per round from our sample of 45 
individuals and we calculated the average of those three allocations. The other stochas-
tic group sample reflected a best-in-group decision and was called “best-in-group sto-
chastic group”. To construct an observation in this second sample we simply chose the 
best individual allocation from a group of three randomly chosen individuals per round, 
again from the sample of our 45 individuals. An observation in this sample served as a 
proxy for a group whose members were able to select their best individual allocation 
decision in each round. This follows the idea of Lorge and Solomon (1955) about the 
truth-wins-standard but in contrast to the original idea our approach did not require the 
optimal solution but only the best individual solution across all group members.  
Both samples of stochastic groups contained 1000 observations and the random combi-
nations of three individuals were unchanged over all rounds of the experiment. For ex-
ample the stochastic group X consisted of individual 4, 15 and 33 during every round of 
the experiment.20 To test hypotheses 1.2 and 1.3 we then compared the Sharpe Ratios of 
those two types of stochastic groups with the Sharpe Ratios of groups in each round.  
                                                   
19
 For an introduction into approaches that involve stochastic groups see Lorge, Irving , D. Fox, J. Davitz, 
and M. Brenner, 1958, A survey of studies contrasting the quality of group performance and individual 
performance, Psychological Bulleting 55, 337-372.. 
20
 There is one caveat in the method of constructing stochastic groups. The individuals that make up one 
observation in a stochastic group have received the feedback for their own personal asset allocation in 
each round of the experiment and not the feedback for the performance of the stochastic group. So it 
might be the case that individuals reacted differently if they received the stochastic group’s feedback 
instead of the feedback for their individual asset allocation. On the other hand it is unclear in which way 
individuals had reacted. So a simple approach looks adequate to us because our stochastic groups only 
serve as a benchmark to judge the decision quality of individuals and groups. 
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Figure 4.1a shows that the average stochastic group sample as well as the best-in group 
stochastic sample outperformed our groups in almost all rounds of the experiment. In 
contrast figure 4.1b reveals that the median Sharpe Ratio in the group sample performed 
similarly to the median of the average stochastic group sample but below the best-in-
group sample. This is evidence that large outliers in the experiments can be found more 
among the worst than the best groups and individuals. The differences between the av-
erage and the median Sharpe Ratios of stochastic groups were barely visible because 
those samples with 1000 observations followed a normal distribution. According to 
Mann-Whitney tests, the difference between the Sharpe Ratios of average stochastic 
groups and our real groups is only significant in 2 out of 15 rounds. So we cannot reject 
hypothesis 1.2 namely that groups perform similarly to average stochastic groups. As 
expected the average Sharpe Ratio of best-in-group stochastic groups was significantly 
higher than the average Sharpe Ratio of our 16 real groups in each but one round of the 
experiment at the 5% level so we cannot reject hypothesis 1.3.  
In short, the sample of our real groups performed as well as the sample of average sto-
chastic groups but clearly failed to reach the performance of best-in group stochastic 
groups. So group discussions did not seem to enhance the performance because our ex-
periment showed that an average allocation of three randomly chosen individuals 
yielded no significantly different results.  
In addition we observed that the sample of average stochastic groups realized signifi-
cantly higher Sharpe Ratios than the individual sample in 9 out of 15 rounds at the 10% 
level and the average Z scores of all 15 rounds is -1.72.21 This result occurred because 
averaging the Sharpe Ratios of individual allocations is not equal to calculating the 
Sharpe Ratio based on average asset allocations of 3 randomly chosen individuals. In 
our data roughly 70% of all observations showed the average Sharpe Ratio of 3 indi-
viduals below the Sharpe Ratio of the average asset allocation of those 3 individuals. 
The reason is that building the average of 3 individual allocations moderates extreme 
positions with very low Sharpe Ratios in our sample (for example the position of 100% 
in the riskiest asset A which yields a Sharpe Ratio of 0.42). So extreme allocations with 
low Sharpe Ratios occurred fewer times in the sample of average stochastic groups than 
                                                   
21
 The Sharpe Ratio of the best-in-group stochastic group sample is significantly higher than the Sharpe 
Ratio of the individual sample which is logical due to the construction method. 
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in the sample of individuals. A comparison between median and average Sharpe Ratios 
for the individual sample supports this observation especially in the first rounds of the 
experiment. The reason is that the average is lower than the median due to a few unsuc-
cessful outliers among the individuals whose impact is moderated if they are combined 
with other individuals like in the sample of average stochastic groups. 
4.5.3  Portfolio risk and asset allocation shifts 
We now focus on the degree of risk in group and individual portfolios.  
Figure 4-2: Volatility in the samples 
Figure 4.2 plots the average portfolio volatility of individuals, groups and both types of 
stochastic groups per round. The sharp increase in the average volatility in the group 
sample in round 6 can be explained by two groups who both allocated a high percent-
age number to the most risky asset (A) in that round. As expected the portfolio volatility 
of individuals is always above the portfolio volatility of both types of stochastic groups. 
The reason is that non-perfectly correlated combinations of individual portfolios are 
always reducing the volatility of the resulting portfolio. The effect is decreasing over the 
rounds because the diversification effect across individuals is also decreasing as most 
of the individuals hold comparable allocations towards the end of the experiment.  
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Figure 4.2 shows that the average portfolio volatility of groups was comparable to the 
one for individuals in most of the rounds. Mann-Whitney tests indicated that there were 
no significant differences between individuals’ and groups’ portfolio volatility at the 5% 
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level in all but two rounds of the experiment. The spike of the average group volatility 
in round 6 can be explained by two groups who both allocated a high percentage num-
ber to the most risky asset (A) in that round. So there is no evidence for a difference 
between individuals’ or groups’ preferences as far as portfolio risk is concerned and we 
cannot reject hypothesis 2. Figure 4.3 supports figure 4.2 in that there were no material 
differences between groups’ and individuals’ chosen asset allocations on average in 
each round. Both, groups and individuals, started with an overweight in the riskiest as-
set (A), an underweight in the least risky asset (B) and quite a good allocation to the 
mid risky asset (C).  
Figure 4-3: Asset allocations 
Figure 4.3 shows the average allocation of groups and individuals to the three risky 
assets (A, B and C) in each round of the experiment. The allocations in figure 4.3 have 
been normalized in order to make them comparable because the allocation to the risk-
free asset (D) does not influence the Sharpe Ratio. So the allocations to the 3 risky as-
sets have been inflated to a total of 100% while keeping the relative weighting of all 3 
risky assets proportional. GA stands for groups’ average allocation in asset A, IA for 
individuals’ average allocation in asset A and so on.  
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From the choice of an allocation we now move on to the shifts of asset weightings in the 
asset allocation from one round to the next. There was no material difference between 
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the amounts of the shifts in the individual and the group sample as figure 4.4 points out. 
A shift represents the sum of all percentage points shifted from the allocation of the last 
round to the allocation in the next round. For example an allocation of A 30%, B 30% 
and C 40% in round 1 to an allocation of A 40%, B 30% and C 30% in round 2 repre-
sents a shift of 20%. Groups shifted a higher amount of percentage points than individu-
als in all but two rounds but the effect was insignificant in every round and therefore we 
cannot reject hypothesis 3. On average both individuals and groups shifted roughly 50% 
points in the first round and then almost linearly decreased this rate to roughly 10% 
points in the last round as can be seen in figure 4.4.  
Figure 4-4: Shifts in the asset allocations 
The figure 4.4 shows the median shifts in the asset allocation expressed as percentage 
points shifted from one asset to another per round for individuals, groups and both sorts 
of stochastic groups. 
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The results in this section led to the conclusion that groups do not choose less risky as-
set allocations and share the same level of flexibility with respect to new allocations. 
4.5.4 Comparison of the performance volatility of the samples 
So far we have only considered averages and medians in all of our samples. Now we 
focus on differences within the samples. To analyze the homogeneity of individuals and 
groups we compared the volatilities of the Sharpe Ratios in the different samples over 
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all rounds of the experiment. Figure 4.5 shows that for all samples the volatility de-
creased during the course of the whole experiment indicating that the participants’ in 
each sample agreed more and more about the optimal allocation in the experiment from 
one round to the next.  
Figure 4-5: Volatility of Sharpe Ratios 
Figure 4.5 shows the volatilities of the Sharpe Ratios in the individual, the group and 
both of the stochastic group samples. 
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We found no significant difference between the sample volatility of individuals and 
groups in a Mann-Whitney test. But the difference between those two samples and the 
two sorts of stochastic group samples is significant at the 5% level. Therefore, the sam-
ples of individuals and groups showed a higher volatility than the samples of both types 
of stochastic groups over the whole experiment. A high volatility across the Sharpe Ra-
tios reflects large discrepancies across the asset weightings and we will address poten-
tial reasons for those discrepancies in the next section.  
To analyze the discrepancies in the performance in more detail one comprehensive 
sample that consisted of the individuals, the groups and average stochastic groups was 
constructed. We then split this comprehensive sample into deciles according to the av-
erage Sharpe Ratio over all 15 rounds of the experiment and we analyzed the structure 
of each decile (figure 4.6).  
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Figure 4-6: Ranking of Sharpe Ratios 
The individuals’, groups’ and average stochastic groups’ samples have been aggre-
gated into one single sample and then deciles according to the average Sharpe Ratios 
(SR) over all 15 rounds have been calculated. In each decile there are 106 observa-
tions. The figure 4.6 shows the number groups and individuals in each of those deciles 
from the top Sharpe Ratios to the bottom Sharpe Ratios.  
 
It can be observed that the average Sharpe Ratios over the whole experiment of most 
individuals as well as most groups were located either in the top or in the bottom decile. 
Given the structuring approach of average stochastic groups this is consistent with our 
previous arguments that an aggregation of individual allocations will lead to a modera-
tion of extreme positions. It is interesting to note also, that 12 out of 16 groups were 
located either in the top two deciles or the bottom two deciles and only 4 groups fell 
into the 6 deciles in the middle. The 7 groups in the lowest 2 deciles did not moderate 
extreme individual positions as much as our sample of average stochastic groups. This 
suggests the presence of a group polarization effect because the unsuccessful groups in 
our sample did not build asset allocations that led to Sharpe Ratios in the middle of the 
sample distribution but made rather bad allocations compared to average stochastic 
groups.  
A sensitivity analysis reveals that the sample distribution of the average Sharpe Ratios 
from the first 5 rounds, the rounds 6-10 and the last 5 rounds were not different and the 
distribution of individuals and groups across the deciles did not change materially. It 
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follows that the observation of large performance discrepancies is stable over the whole 
experiment as well as over those 5 round periods.  
4.5.5 Decision-making processes of the groups 
From the section before we know that the volatility across groups was high (figure 4.5) 
and that most of the groups either performed very well or very badly (figure 4.6). In this 
section we test hypothesis 4 which offers an explanation for those results. The basic 
idea is that the level of information exchange across group members is positively related 
to the performance of a group. The recordings of the group discussions reveal that the 
intensity and the frequency of the information exchange are different across the groups 
in our sample. We decided to judge the relationship between the level of information 
exchange and the performance with four factors which are listed in table 4.2. Those are 
quantifiable factors in order to measure the true information exchange level as objec-
tively as possible. The scores of each factor then allow a crude assessment of the level 
of information exchange across group members. We only rely on recordings between 
the start of the experiment and round 9 because the differences in the Sharpe Ratios 
from round 10 onwards are small because most of the groups have found a pretty good 
asset allocation after those first 9 rounds.  
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Table 4-2: Factors in the decision making processes of groups 
Table 4.2 contains the four factors of the group decision-making process for each group 
(Focus Time, Ratio, Suggestions and Arguments) as well as the spare time used to cal-
culated the factor “ratio”. The corresponding scores and the aggregated Information 
Exchange Scores (IE Scores) are listed for each group except for group 5 because the 
discussion recording of this group is not available due to technical issues. 
 
 
The first factor is called “focus time” and represents the minutes each group was focus-
ing on the experiment by discussing various issues about how to solve the asset alloca-
tion problem. Factor two is named “ratio” and reflects the ratio of focus time and spare 
time where spare time is defined as the time the group discussed other topics than the 
experiment. The reason to include this factor is that not every experimental session was 
equally long and this factor serves as a measure to judge a group’s focus on the experi-
ment independently from the absolute level of focus time. The third factor “sugges-
tions” measures how many suggestions each group has brought up internally by adding 
up every individual suggestion of every group member. A suggestion is defined as a 
statement of a group member about how much weight a certain asset should receive in 
the asset allocation. Factor four is named “arguments” and counts the number of argu-
ments that have been brought up by the group members during the discussion. An ar-
gument is defined as a statement that supports a group member’s suggestion in that it 
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either points out an advantage or demonstrates quality in order to convince the other 
group members about the suggestion.  
Then the results of each factor were aggregated into a single measure called “informa-
tion exchange score” (last column in table 4.2). Every group that scored above the me-
dian in all four factors was categorized as a high-information-exchange-group (HIE-
group). In total 6 groups are categorized as HIE groups. Groups that scored below the 
median in all four factors were referred to as low-information-exchange-groups (LIE-
group) and we found 5 such groups in our sample. 4 groups are not categorized because 
they performed above the median in some but not all four factors so we cannot judge if 
they belong to the HIE or the LIE group. One group was excluded because the recording 
was not available due to technical issues. Finally, the Sharpe Ratios of HIE-groups and 
LIE-groups were compared for every round of the experiment and Mann-Whitney tests 
served to analyze the significance of the differences.22 
Figure 4-7: Sharpe Ratios of groups 
Figure 4.7 contains the average Sharpe Ratios of individuals, high-information-
exchange groups (HIE-groups), low-information-exchange groups (LIE-groups), aver-
age stochastic groups and best-in-group stochastic groups for every round in the ex-
periment. The sharp fall of the average Sharpe Ratio in the LIE groups in round 5 was 
because of a 100% allocation to the riskfree asset of one group which had a strong 
negative impact. The curve for the LIE groups would be much smoother if we exclude 
this particular group in round 5.  
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22
 We acknowledge that the correlations across our four factors are pretty high with a range from 0.557 to 
0.923. 
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Figure 4.7 shows that the Sharpe Ratios of HIE-groups were larger than the Sharpe Ra-
tios for LIE-groups in every round of the experiment. The difference is significant ac-
cording to Mann-Whitney tests at the 10% level in 10 rounds. HIE groups also beat in-
dividuals at the 10% significance level in 12 out of 15 rounds. Furthermore, HIE-groups 
significantly outperformed average stochastic groups in 12 out of 15 rounds at the 10% 
level and marginally beat the performance of the best-in-group stochastic groups in al-
most every round. In contrast the average Sharpe Ratio for LIE-groups was even lower 
than for individuals in the first 6 rounds but not on a significant level except for 2 
rounds. The sharp fall of the average Sharpe Ratio in the LIE groups in round 5 was 
because of a 100% allocation to the riskfree asset of one group which had a strong nega-
tive impact. If we exclude this observation the performance of LIE groups in figure 4.7 
would be much smoother but the disappointing results of LIE groups do not change ma-
terially. 
It is not surprising that the largest differences between HIE and LIE groups occurred in 
the first rounds of the experiment because the information about the best performer in 
each round helped every participant to judge his performance round by round. While 
HIE groups identified efficient allocations pretty early in the experiment due the high 
information exchange, LIE groups needed more time to evaluate their performance. 
In a sensitivity analysis we structured the HIE and LIE groups slightly different by add-
ing the four uncategorized groups to either HIE or LIE groups. The results do not 
change materially as the sample of HIE groups always outperformed the sample of LIE 
groups. We conclude that in line with the thinking of Stasser and Titus (1985) a high 
level of information exchange in a group leads to a significantly better performance. 
4.5.6 Decision-making time 
From the section above we know that the factors “focus time” and “ratio” are positively 
related to a better performance within the sample of groups. A comparison of the time 
used to enter an asset allocation decision on the computer terminal between HIE-groups 
and LIE-groups reveals that HIE-groups used more time in every round of the experi-
ment and Mann-Whitney tests confirm that the difference is significant in 10 rounds at 
the 10% level. Maybe groups who exchange more information perform better because a 
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higher level of information exchange is linked to more time to analyze the allocation 
task in our experiment.  
Individuals had no chance to exchange any information so it is not surprising that they 
needed much less time to enter their asset allocation. On average individuals used 51 
seconds to decide whereas groups used 82 seconds per round. Mann-Whitney tests 
prove that the difference between groups’ and individuals’ was significant at the 5% 
level in 14 out of 15 rounds. Figure 4.8 shows the average and the median decision time 
of individuals and groups per round. The time used to define the allocation decreased 
for both groups and individuals during the experiment but the difference is stable.  
Figure 4-8: Decision-making time 
Figure 4.8 shows the average and the median time used to decide about the allocation 
for groups and for individuals per round.  
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4.5.7 Performance beliefs of the participants 
Finally, we focused on the participants’ ex post opinions about the performance of 
groups versus individuals in our experiment. After the completion of their experimental 
session in total 45 students expressed the view in questionnaire II that groups will 
achieve higher Sharpe Ratios in the asset allocation task and only 18 students believed 
individuals will outperform groups. The other participants expressed no opinion. This 
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observation was much stronger across group members as only 4 out of 34 group mem-
bers believed individuals would outperform in the experiment whereas 14 out of 29 of 
the individuals shared that belief. It seems as if the participants in the group experiment 
put value on the fact that they could solve the experiment as a group. But the achieved 
Sharpe Ratios in the experiment only confirm the group member’s impression in HIE-
groups. 
4.6 Discussion and conclusion 
Groups on average outperform individuals in an asset allocation task with intellective 
features but the difference is not significant. However, an analysis of the group sample 
average disregards the heterogeneity of the groups’ performances. Groups with a high 
level of information exchange performed as well as best-in-group stochastic groups 
which by construction selected the best individual allocation of 3 randomly chosen in-
dividuals. Therefore, groups marginally beat even a special version of the truth-wins-
standard. On the other hand groups with a low level of information exchange underper-
formed all other samples and the difference was significant in the first rounds of the 
experiment.  
Our results support the existing literature by providing evidence that the decision-
making process, in our case addressed via the information exchange level, significantly 
influences the success of groups. In line with the thesis of Janis (1982) this paper shows 
that successful groups evaluate available information and ideas of all group members 
before choosing an asset allocation. In contrast unsuccessful groups typically opt for the 
first suggestion by a group member and therefore do not make use of the possibility to 
pool their personal information. Our results also emphasized the hidden profile issue by 
Stasser and Titus (1985) from another angle as we demonstrated that a lack of informa-
tion exchange is related to an underperformance of groups. It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to analyze reasons for the differences across the information exchange level in the 
groups in depth, but further research is needed to figure out how certain factors influ-
ence group members’ willingness to exchange information. 
One potential answer lies in the group polarization effect of Moscovici and Zavalloni 
(1969). The worst performing groups achieved Sharpe Ratios significantly below those 
of stochastic groups mimicking a decision-making process based on even-handed com-
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promises between the group members. It seems that the absence of information ex-
changes within the group does not seem to moderate individual opinions, i.e. asset 
weightings in the asset allocation, but rather produces extreme asset allocations. So 
groups who do not carefully discuss potential solutions but agree to the first suggestion 
of one group member might implement more extreme asset weightings than the aggre-
gated opinion of all group members. 
After the experiment a large part of all participants shared the view that groups should 
outperform individuals. It might be the case that people simply prefer to take decisions 
in a group regardless of the decision-making process and the achieved results. One rea-
son could be the delegation of responsibility from an individual to the group where po-
tential harm due to a bad decision is shared in a group and therefore no single individual 
is blamed completely. Also it is probably less disappointing to be wrong as part of a 
group than being wrong individually. However, more research is needed to analyze the 
confidence of individuals to better solve problems in a group. 
Indeed in reality many asset managers organize their decision-making process of fund 
management in groups as Baer, Kempf and Ruenzi (2005) report. However, further re-
search is needed to analyze people’s preferences in the domain of financial decision-
making in general. With respect to group decision-making in practice we point out that 
group decisions do not add value per se unless all the group members’ opinions are 
communicated and discussed. So whenever group decisions need to be taken it is impor-
tant to create an environment which motivates people to exchange information. 
Another meaningful extension to our experiment would be to introduce a judgmental 
element by letting the participants trade the assets they use for the asset allocation task 
during the experiment. In such a task the participants not only have to find the optimal 
solution for the asset allocation problem but do also have to take the preferences and 
actions of other participants into account. An interaction of participants reflects reality 
much better because the prices and the returns of assets on financial markets are not 
stable as in our experiment but heavily dependent on the investors’ supply and demand 
situation. Adding an interactive element onto our experimental design might add more 
insight into the decision-making process, the rationality, and the potential success of 
individuals and groups on financial markets. 
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4.8 Appendix I 
The instructions provided in this section are translated from the original German 
instructions. 
 
Instructions to the experiment 
 
Welcome to our experiment! In this experiment you will be asked to take several deci-
sions on a computer terminal. Your payoff depends on your decisions and on the deci-
sions of the other participants. So please read the following instructions carefully. 
In the experiment certain technical expressions are used that might not be familiar to you. 
Those expressions will be introduced on the next pages of this instruction. In case you 
have any questions please raise your hand and one of the instructors will come to your 
place and answer your questions. 
The participants in this experiment are students with different backgrounds from the Uni-
versity of Zurich and from the ETZH. All participants receive exactly the same information 
like you. All participants can keep and use the instructions during the whole experiment. 
 
The experiment starts as soon as every participant has fully understood the course of the 
experiment and has correctly completed the questionnaire I. 
Please respect that communication with the other participants is not allowed during the 
experiment. Mobile phones must be switched off. Please operate only those functions on 
the computer which are needed in the course of the experiment. Communication with 
other participants or bugger with the computer leads to an exclusion of the experiment.  
In case you have any question the instructors are ready to help.  
  
 
The Performance of Groups and Individuals in Financial Decision-Making  
 
83
 
Goal of the experiment 
The goal of the experiment is for all participants to combine 4 different assets (3 risky 
assets A, B, C and 1 riskfree asset D) in such a way to achieve as much return as possi-
ble with as small risk as possible over all rounds of the experiment. The experiment con-
sists of 15 equal rounds in which all participants can change the allocation across the 4 
different assets in order to increase their risk-return-ratio.  
All relevant technical expressions of the experiment will be explained in the next section. 
 
Explanations 
Asset: An asset is an investment that increases (or decreases) in value. In a riskfree 
asset (like for example a bank account) the return is fixed. In a risky asset like for exam-
ple a stock the return is variable.  
 
Return: The return is defined as the increase or decrease in value of an asset expressed 
in percentage points. An asset with a return of 5% increases its value by 5% and an asset 
with a return of -1% reduces its value by 1%.  
 
Scenarios: The return of an asset in the experiment depends on the occurance of 4 dif-
ferent scenarios (I, II, III or IV). The probability of an occurrance of a scenario is equal 
(i.e. 25%) for all scenarios. The following table provides an overview about the returns of 
the different assets A, B, C and D in the different scenarios.  
The table is at your disposal on the computer screen during the whole experiment.  
Scenario Probability of 
occurance 
Return 
Asset A  
Return 
Asset B 
Return 
Asset C 
Return 
Asset D 
I 0.25 15% 4% 0% 1% 
II 0.25 -2% 5% 5% 1% 
III 0.25 8% 1% 9% 1% 
IV 0.25 -4% 0% -1% 1% 
 
Example 1: In scenario I asset A returns 15%, asset B returns 4%, asset C returns 0% 
and asset D returns 1%. 
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Example 2: In Scenario II a combination of 50% in asset A, 50% in asset B and nothing in 
assets C and D returns 1.5% (0.5 * (-2)% + 0.5 * 5% = 1.5%). 
 
Mean Return: The mean return is the return that is achieved with an asset or a combina-
tion of assets in the mean across different scenarios.  
Example 3: The mean return of asset B across all 4 scenarios is 
  0.25 * 4% + 0.25 * 5% + 0.25 * 1% + 0.25 * 0% = 2.5% 
Example 4: The mean return of a combination of assets with a weight of 50% in B, 50% in 
D and nothing in A and C is 
         0.25 * (0.5 * 4% + 0.5 * 1%) + 0.25 * (0.5 * 5% + 0.5 * 1%) + 
  0.25 * (0.5 * 1% + 0.5 * 1%) + 0.25 * (0.5 * 0% + 0.5 * 1%) = 1.75% 
 
Excess return: The mean return of an asset or a combination of assets minus the risk-
free return of the asset D yields the excess return: 
Excess return = Mean return of an asset – Riskfree return 
Example 5: The excess return of asset B is 2.5% - 1% = 1.5%. 
Example 6: The excess return of a combination of assets with a weight of 50% in B, 50% 
in D and nothing in A and C is 1.75% - 1% = 0.75%. 
 
Risk: Risk is defined as the variability of the returns of an asset or a combination of as-
sets in different scenarios. The larger the variability is the higher is the risk. The risk is 
calculated by taking the square root of the sum of the squared differences between sce-
nario returns and the mean return of an asset. When we call the scenario returns of an 
asset RI, RII, RIII, RIV in the different scenarios and M the mean return of this asset then 
the formula for the risk is: 
 
Example 7: If we assume, RI= RII=5% and RIII=RIV=10%. Then the mean return is  
M=0.25 * 5% + 0.25 * 5% + 0.25 * 10% + 0.25 * 10%= 7.5% and the risk is  
 
 
2222 %)5.7%10(25.0%)5.7%10(25.0%)5.7%5(25.0%)5.7%5(25.0 −+−+−+−=Risk
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Risk-return-ratio: The risk-return-ratio is defined as the ratio between the excess return 
of an asset and the risk of an asset or a combination of assets: 
Risk-return-ratio = Excess return / Risk 
The risk-return-ratio increases if the excess return increases or if the risk decreases.  
Special case: If the risk is 0 then the risk-return-ratio is also 0. 
Example 8: An asset with a mean return of 5% and a risk of 8% offers a risk-return-ratio 
of (5% - 1%) / 8% = 0.5. 
 
Payoffs 
Your payoff is linked to your performance in the experiment. The relevant measure is the 
risk-return-ratio. Based on your achieved risk-return-ratio in each round the mean risk-
return-ratio for the whole experiment is calculated. During the experiment you see per-
manently the level of your average risk-return-ratio across all rounds played so far. 
Your average risk-return-ratio will be multiplied with 30. This will yield the payoff in CHF 
that you receive at the end of the experiment.  
The participant with the highest average risk-return-ratio receives an additional bonus of 
20 CHF. For the participants ranked 2., 3., and 4. with respect to the risk-return-ratio a 
bonus of 10 CHF will be paid. In addition to the performance based payoff every partici-
pant receives a show-up bonus of 10 CHF.    
The payoffs are paid immediately after the experiment by the instructors.  
 
Experimental design 
The experiment consists of 15 rounds and one trial round. 
Before the trial round questionnaire I must be correctly completed. Hand in your ques-
tionnaire I to the instructors as soon as you have it completed.  
Every participant has to choose in each round how he wants to weight the 4 different 
assets A, B, C and D to achieve the highest possible risk-return-ratio. Every participant 
can allocate 0% to 100% to each asset (enter the weight without decimal places into the 
computer). The sum of all asset weights must add up to 100%. 
As soon as all participants have entered their combination of assets the computer will 
calculate the mean return, the risk and the risk-return-ratio of each participant.  
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Every participant will be informed about his own numbers on the computer screen. In 
addition every participant gets informed about the highest risk-return-ratio that was 
achieved by a participant in the round. With this a round is completed. At the beginning of 
the next round each participant can chose a new weight for each of the 4 assets. This 
process will be repeated until 15 rounds have been played.  
 
Course of the experiment 
Please show your answers to an instructor as soon as you have completed questionnaire 
I. The trial round starts as soon as every participant correctly answered all questions in 
questionnaire I.  
 
Trial round 
In the trial round you can make yourself familiar with the computer and the different ac-
tions you need to take during the experiment. On the screen top left shows the round that 
is played and top right how much time you have left to enter your asset weights.  
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The upper table shows the return of each asset A, B, C, D in the different scenarios of the 
experiment. 
The table in the middle shows your weightings of each asset in the previous rounds and 
the corresponding return, risk and risk-return-ratio you have achieved with your alloca-
tion. It also shows the highest risk-return-ratio of a participant in a round of the experi-
ment. Each completed round will be listed in this table. 
Your overall performance is the basis for your payoff at the end of the experiment. The 
average risk-return-ratio is the relevant measure and it is shown below the middle table of 
the screen. 
In each round you see 4 small boxes on the bottom of the screen. Please enter the 
weightings of each asset for the next round in those boxes. Check your weights and 
make sure that they add up to 100%. Then please confirm by clicking ok. You have 3 
minutes to enter your asset allocation in each round. If you have not entered an allocation 
for each asset within 3 minutes 100% will be booked into the riskfree asset D.  
As soon as all participants completed the trial round the experiment starts with round 1.  
 
Rounds 
The course of each round is similar to the trial round and the screens also look identical. 
As soon as all the participants enter their asset allocation you will receive the information 
about your performance in the round. 
 
End of the experiment 
After round 15 the experiment is over. The instructors will inform you accordingly and 
hand out the payoffs.  
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4.9 Appendix II 
The questionnaires provided in this section are translated from the original Ger-
man questionnaires. It is important to note that technical expressions like return, 
risk or volatility have been introduced and defined in the instructions (see appen-
dix I). In addition every participant had the chance to ask questions before com-
pleting the questionnaire I. 
  
Questionnaire I – Questions before the start of the experiment 
1. In 4 scenarios a certain combination of assets A, B, C and D yielded the following 
returns: 
    3% -1% 6% 4% 
  
What is the mean return of this combination of assets? 
3% 5% 6% 1% 
O O O O 
2. What is the excess return of this combination of assets with a riskfree rate of 1%? 
4% 3% 2% 0% 
O O O O 
3. Which of the following two assets is riskier? 
Asset X with the following returns in the 4 
scenarios of the experiment 
12%, -6%, 9% and -1% 
Asset Y with the following returns in the 4 
scenarios of the experiment 
3%, 0%, 2% and -1% 
O O 
4. Which of the two combinations of assets offers the higher risk-return-ratio? 
Combination X with an excess return of 5 
% and a risk of 10% 
Combination Y with an excess return of 
4% and a risk 4% 
O O 
5. What is the payoff of a participant if he achieved an average risk-return-ratio of 0.5 in 
the experiment (without any bonus and without the show up fee)? 
20 CHF 15 CHF 12 CHF 10 CHF 
O O O O 
6. Did you understand the goal and the rules of the experiment? 
O  Yes    O  No 
  
 
The Performance of Groups and Individuals in Financial Decision-Making  
 
89
 
Questionnaire II – Questions after the experiment 
1. Age:........................ 
2. Gender: O  Female  O  Male 
3. What do you study? 
Natural Science 
(ETHZ) 
Anything but natural 
science (ETHZ) 
Economics (UniZH) Anything but 
economics (UniZH) 
O  O  O  O  
4. Who do you think will achieve higher risk-return-ratios in the experiment, groups or 
individuals? 
Groups Individuals Similar Equal 
O O O O 
5. Would you have preferred to participate as an individual (as a group member) in the 
experiment?  
O  Yes     O  No    O Does not mat-
ter 
6. How do you judge your risk-return-ratio relative to the other participants in the ex-
periment? 
Very low Low Rather low Average Rather 
high 
High Very high 
O O O O O O O 
7. How did the risk-return-ratio of your asset allocations evolved during the experiment? 
Surely 
increased 
Increased Rather 
increased 
Constant Rather 
decreased 
Decreased Surely 
decreased 
O O O O O O O 
8. Do you have a private securities account?  
O  Yes     O  No 
9. How often do you read financial news or financial articles?  
Daily Almost 
daily 
Weekly Monthly Quarterly Yearly Never  
O O O O O O O 
10. How would you judge your interest in financial topics? 
Very low Low Rather low Average Rather 
high 
High Very high 
O O O O O O O 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
With these concluding remarks I would like to point out again the main contributions of 
my PhD Dissertation to research and to provide some advice for practitioners. In addi-
tion I also address some limits of my results and provide ideas for future research.  
The main contribution of the first two essays to academic research is to empirically 
show that overconfidence is not only a phenomenon across private investors and mutual 
fund managers but also across a sample of Swiss pension fund managers. However, I 
have demonstrated that the degree of overconfidence in the domain of financial markets 
is different across individuals and so a calculation of a sample average disregards the 
heterogeneity of the overconfidence phenomenon. Personal characteristics like educa-
tion, experience and age influence a person’s degree of overconfidence. Nevertheless, 
overconfidence generally serves as an explanation for the popularity of active manage-
ment at Swiss pension plans as many managers seem to be prone to the better-than-
average-effect. Given the mediocre track record of active management at Swiss pension 
plans on average such expectations seem to be very optimistic. The most important rec-
ommendation to practitioners therefore is to get aware of overconfidence effects like 
miscalibration and the better-than-average-effect and to take those into account when 
estimating returns on financial markets and when analyzing the capabilities of asset 
managers. 
The third essay contributes to the existing literature by proving that groups do not out-
perform individuals per se but that the information exchange across group members is a 
critical factor for success. Therefore, the recommendation to practice is to create an at-
mosphere in a group decision-making process which motivates all group members to 
exchange all available personal information. 
However, there are a couple of arguments and ideas that need to be addressed on a very 
general level not only to put the different results of my research efforts into perspective 
but also to outline further potential areas for research. 
We know that overconfidence can lead individuals to formulate biased views regarding 
the performance of assets on financial markets and the performance of their own asset 
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managers. But bear in mind that there is no way to link the specific performance of one 
pension plan to a participant’s specific degree of overconfidence. In other words, we 
cannot prove any relationship between subjective degrees of overconfidence and the 
corresponding performance on financial markets because we only observe aggregated 
data. The conclusions of the first two essays therefore refer to the sample as a whole but 
we can not rule out that some participants correctly believe themselves to be above av-
erage and to be able to forecast future returns very precisely. Exactly because of this 
heterogeneity regarding individual levels of overconfidence further research should fo-
cus on empirical evidence about the relationship between subjective overconfidence and 
subjective performance on financial markets.  
Furthermore, the linear regression model in the first essay only captures roughly 20% of 
the variability of the participants’ confidence intervals. So it would be interesting to 
search for additional factors which might influence a person’s subjective degree of 
overconfidence and to analyze the relationship between an investor’s degree of overcon-
fidence and his/her performance on financial markets in more depth. 
The third essay presents evidence that the level of information exchange across group 
members is significantly related to the performance of the group in my market experi-
ment. However, the results rely on the recordings of the group discussions and it ap-
pears highly plausible that other factors which have not been captured in my approach 
influence the performance of groups. More detailed observations of group decision-
making processes are needed to shed some light on these driving forces. Also the ex-
perimental design in the third essay is a purely intellective task but in reality the asset 
allocation on real financial markets also involves judgmental elements. Another mean-
ingful extension to the experiment would be to introduce a judgmental element by let-
ting the participants trade the assets they use for the asset allocation task during the ex-
periment. An interaction of participants reflects reality much better because the prices 
and the returns of assets on financial markets are not stable as in our experiment but 
heavily dependent on the investors’ supply and demand situation. 
On the one hand I hope to have motivated other PhD candidates to continue the research 
efforts in the topics I have addressed in my collection of three essays and on the other 
hand I hope to provide some practical input about how to take better financial decisions.  
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